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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents an examination of the legal developments made in wage 
regulations within the United Kingdom. The period that has been chosen for 
examination spans from the 18th to the 21st century. This period was chosen for 
examination due to the huge social, political, economic and legal changes that took 
place within the United Kingdom during these years. These changes saw major 
developments made within the field of employment law and worker’s rights in general. 
This period also saw the enactment of the first piece of legislation that regulated wages 
in the industrial world – the Trade Boards Act of 1909.  
 
This thesis examines the journey that the United Kingdom took since the enactment 
of the 1909 Act that lead to the current system of wage regulation – The National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998.  
 
This thesis has also touched on various campaigns that have called for a Living Wage 
and has assessed what impact these have had on Government policy. It looks at the 
National Living Wage, that was introduced in 2016, and examines whether this is a 
living wage in the sense of the word. 
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Methodology 
 
This thesis set out to examine the legal developments that have been made in the 
area of wages within the United Kingdom, during the period between the 19th-21st 
centuries. The principle aims have been to examine and discuss, what I believe, have 
been the significant social, economic and legal changes that have taken place 
between these periods that ultimately have led to the creation of a statutory NLW. 
 
This thesis does not contain any empirical research. Instead a considerable number 
of secondary sources were used when writing this thesis. These included Acts of the 
UK Parliament and Acts of Parliament from Australia and New Zealand. In addition to 
this a number of Statutory Instruments were used whilst writing this thesis. 
Government Reports were also used along with the Reports from a number of Select 
Committees. I relied on a number of newspaper articles and BBC news reports along 
with an extensive number of academic articles that were used to compare varying 
opinions on the examined subject. These proved invaluable when addressing the 
question that was examined in this thesis. Case law has not played a significant role 
in the development of wages within the UK, although I was able to use an Australian 
case when assessing particular elements of the thesis. The majority of the data and 
figures came from research published by the Office of National Statistics, the Living 
Wage Foundation and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Low Pay 
Commission. I also used a number of social science text books, political parties’ 
election manifestos and a number of social studies that looked at poverty and its 
relation with wages. Finally, a number of reports from Hansard were used when 
assessing the mood of Government and its response to public opinion. These reports 
were again invaluable with helping to explain the motives behind changes in legislation 
and, in some cases, the reluctance to legislate. 
 
All of these sources were analysed and discussed throughout this thesis and, where 
appropriate, the differing opinions were compared to help better the answer to my 
thesis question. 
 
My research began with general background reading on the subject of wages and 
poverty. I read a number of social science and historical books to gain an initial 
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understanding of the issue of wages in the UK. These sources directed me to a 
number of other sources that better highlighted the link between poverty and wages 
and the campaigns against sweating and ultimately the call for some form of statutory 
wage regulation. Other sources allowed for a comparison between various forms of 
wage regulation within different jurisdictions; notably the Australian and New Zealand 
systems. This helped when explaining early attempts in the UK at wage regulation – 
the TBA 1909. 
 
I did encounter some difficulties whilst undertaking this research. This was 
predominantly whilst researching early legislation and finding Government Reports 
from the 19th Century. I had to contact the National Achieves for some of these 
sources. Similarly, articles and legislation from other jurisdictions was not easy to 
access and I feel that I could have elaborated further on the early Australian and New 
Zealand systems had more sources been readily available. I also found that the 
majority of academic articles that have been written on wages mainly seem to revolve 
around economic and social science fields. It was quite difficult to find specific articles 
that were purely based on the legal developments that have been made. As such I 
had to read much more broadly around the subject in order to be able to answer the 
question set by this thesis. Not all of the information that I researched had a direct 
bearing on the question asked and was not included in this thesis.  
 
Another difficulty that I encountered whilst undertaking this research was deciding 
what content to include and what to exclude. There were a lot of sources that were 
available on wages from a social, economic and political angle, but a limited number 
of resources solely on the legal developments that have been made on wages within 
the United Kingdom.  
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“It is a serious national evil that any class of His Majesty’s subjects should 
receive less than a living wage in return for their utmost exertions. It was 
formerly supposed that the working of the laws of supply and demand 
would naturally regulate or eliminate that evil…” (Winston Churchill1) 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis presents an examination of the developments in wage legislation in the 
United Kingdom, looking at the period between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
This period has been chosen for examination due to the huge social, economic and 
political changes that took place within the United Kingdom during this time. 
 
My thesis will begin with an analysis of the early attempts at regulating wages in the 
UK. The Trade Boards Act 1909 was the first piece of legislation that controlled the 
issue low pay in Britain. Interestingly, the United Kingdom was not the first country to 
enact legislation aimed at tacking low pay. Australia and New Zealand had earlier 
passed laws governing wages in the 1890s2. My research will examine the different 
approaches and methods that were taken by each of these countries and their early 
attempts at tackling the issue of low pay. 
 
Early attempts were made by the Independent Labour Party at introducing a National 
Living Wage. In 1931 James Maxton MP, proposed the Living Wage Bill in the House 
of Commons. He argued that a living wage would allow people to consume ‘the 
essential things of life… food, better illumination of those homes and better 
sanitation3’. The issues that Maxton identified have remained prevalent and continue 
to dominate the debate over fair wages, the need for statutory regulation and the cost 
of living. During the post-war years the welfare state gradually began to eclipse the 
demand for a living wage. The provisions of education, health, housing and pensions, 
along with the growth of collective bargaining resulted in less vocal demands for a 
living wage4.  The thesis examines the developments made to the welfare system and 
																																																						
1
 Trade Boards Bill, HC Deb, 28
th
 April 1909, col 388 
2
 Factory and Shops Act 1896 (Australia); The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 (New 
Zealand) 
3
 Living Wage Bill Deb 6
th
 February 1931, col 2271 
4
 Jane Wills, ‘The Living Wage’ available from www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/livingwage/history.html, 
accessed 19
th
 October 2016	
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analyses if and how this has impacted on wage legislation. It will delve briefly into the 
attitudes of Governments overtime and explore their various views of State 
intervention of wages. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s were turbulent times where poverty began to raise its head and 
many workers started to feel its effects. In particular, this affected those workers who 
had not collectivised their wages, and who were left to the Wage Councils5. During the 
1980s successive Conservative governments viewed the work of the Wage Councils 
as both unnecessary and undesirable and consequently they were abolished by 
19936. The rationale underpinning the Government’s policy to abolish the Wages 
Councils and how, if it did, impact upon workers’ wages is assessed. 
 
Towards the latter half of the 1990s the Labour party formed a Government and began 
a process of initialising a number of social reforms. Amongst these was the enactment 
of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. In 1997 the Low Pay Commission (LPC) was 
established as an independent body to ‘… recommend the initial level at which the 
National Minimum Wage might be introduced …’7 Unlike the Trade Boards Act 1909 
the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 set a minimum level of pay for all workers8. My 
research evaluates the purpose of the National Minimum Wage and contrasts this with 
the Trade Boards Act 1909. 
 
During the 1990s, in Baltimore, USA, a campaign had taken form whereby low paid 
workers were demanding a living wage9.  Similar campaigns began to gather support 
in London’s East End in 2001. An alliance of the community launched a campaign to 
ensure that their low-paid members secured hourly wages that were sufficient to 
provide them and their families with a basic, but acceptable, standard of living. My 
research concludes by analysing the campaigns for a living wage in both the United 
																																																						
5
 Wage Councils still covered as many as 3.5 million workers by the late 1970s 
6
 Paul Edwards, Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice (2
nd
 edn, Blackwells, London, 2003), pp. 
447-469 
7
 Low Pay Commission, The National Minimum Wage: first report on the Low Pay Commission (Cm 
3976, 1998)  
8
 S1(2) National Minimum Wage Act 1998. The term ‘worker’ is defined under s54(3) and has the 
same meaning as that under s230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
9
 Kayte Lawton and Matthew Pennycock, ‘Beyond The Bottom Line: The Challenges and 
Opportunities of a Living Wage’, Resolution Foundation, 2013, p.8	
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Kingdom and United States. It looks at the work carried out by the campaign and the 
subsequent legislation that followed. Finally, it addresses the fundamental nature of 
the National Living Wage and questions whether it satisfies the principles on which a 
living wage is based. In so doing I offer suggestions of what could be done further to 
address the pertinent issue of low pay in the United Kingdom. 
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Chapter 1  
Early Wage Regulation in the United Kingdom 
  
According to Kaufman the neoclassical theory of minimum wages in a competitive 
market has the potential to raise the pay of low productivity workers above a natural 
rate determined by marginal rates of productivity leading to job losses and wage 
stickiness, i.e. workers clustered around the minimum rate and preventing jobs being 
filled at lower rates of pay.10 Conversely, according to Card and Kruger in the neo-
monopolistic model, where the labour market is not competitive monopsony, where 
employers have the power to pay workers below their market value, and labour 
market segmentation, the minimum wage can raise pay above so-called market 
clearing/competitive levels, with no job losses or gains.11   
 
The Ordinance of Labourers 1349 is considered by many to be the first piece of 
English labour law.12 It was issued by King Edward III in June of that year as a 
response to the outbreak of the Black Death between 1348-1350.13 It is estimated that 
40% of the population had died as a result of the Black Death leaving a huge shortage 
of unskilled labourers throughout the country.14 The purpose dictated that everybody 
- under the age of sixty - must work, that employers must not hire excess workers and 
that these workers must not be paid higher than pre-plague level wages and that food 
must be reasonably priced with no excess profit. 
 
The English Parliament of 1351 made an attempt to reinforce the Ordinance by the 
enactment of the Statute of Labourers.15 Its aim was to suppress the labour force by 
implementing restrictions on wages (the Statute imposed a maximum wage) and 
																																																						
10
 Roger Kaufman, ‘On wage stickiness in Britain’s competitive sector’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations [1984] 22 (1), p 101-112 
11
 David Cars and Alan Krueger, Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage 
(Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995) 
12
 Mark Rothstein and Lance Liebman, Employment Law: Cases and Materials (6
th
 edn, Foundation 
Press, London, 2007), p. 20 
13
 Frederick Cartwright and Michael Biddiss, Disease and History (Thistle, London, 2014), pp. 32-46 
14
 What was the Economy Like After the Black Death? 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070430031619/http://www.cf.ac.uk/hisar/teach/history/projects/plague/
economy.html Accessed 25 October 2016 
15
 Repealed by the Law Revision Act 1863	
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prohibiting the movement of workers from their homes in search of improved working 
conditions – such as higher wages. 
 
Statutory support for minimum wage levels in the United Kingdom began in modern 
times with the Fair Wages Resolution of 1891. It required employers engaged on 
government contracts to pay at least the wage level generally recognised for either 
the sector or locality concerned. It was passed in response to public concern over the 
system of sweated labour. At the time the Resolution was passed it was seen as a 
more acceptable and practicable measure than minimum wage legislation. The 
Resolution constituted the only element of government intervention in the wage 
determination process at the turn of the century.16 The 1891 Resolution was 
superseded by a second Resolution in 1909. 
 
The Trade Boards Act 1909 (TBA 1909) followed on from the Resolution. Its purpose 
was to establish Trade Boards for specific industries to fix minimum wage levels. The 
Trade Boards (later known as Wages Councils) were, for the most part, abolished in 
1993. The final Wages Council; the Agricultural Wages Board, was abolished in 
2013.17  
 
The Call to Arms 
 
The TBA 1909 was an Act of Parliament which constituted to the Liberal Government’s 
agenda of social reform between 1906 and 1911.18 However, since the TBA 1909 
established legal control of wages, it was in a category all of its own. The last vestiges 
of pre-industrial wage regulation had been removed in 1824 when the power of London 
magistrates to fix the wages of silk weavers in Spitalfields was stopped.19 Until the 
TBA 1909 there was no direct State intervention in the determination of workers’ 
wages. During the intervening years control over certain conditions of employment 
had been accepted but the use of the law to settle the price of labour was State action 
																																																						
16
 Ernest Henry Phelps-Brown, The Growth of British Industrial Relations (Macmillan & Co, London, 
1959), pp 197-201 
17
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, S 72  
18
 The reforms represent the beginnings of the modern welfare state and included such Acts as; 
Children and Young Persons Act 1908; Old-Age Pensions Act 1908; Trade Boards Act 1909 and 
National Insurance Act 1911 
19
 Frederick Bayliss, British Wages Councils (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962), p 1 
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of a different kind. It amounted to direct intervention in the arrangement of a price 
between a buyer and a seller, and in that sense the TBA 1909 was the most radical 
measure of the Liberal Government. Tawney described it as: 
   
In reality, the silent abandonment of the doctrine, held for three generations with an 
almost religious intensity, that wages should be settled, as it was said, by free 
competition, and by free competition alone, is one of the most remarkable changes in 
economic opinion which has taken place in the last hundred years.20 
 
The TBA 1909 sought to alleviate a social evil which had deeply moved a growing 
number of people towards the latter part of the nineteenth century. The degradation of 
the working population by what was popularly called sweating was always, wherever 
found, associated with extremely low wages. However, the decision to use the law to 
raise these workers’ wages was, according to Bayliss, ‘arrived at with a full 
appreciation of the breach which the Act made in the traditional relation between State 
and industry over wages.’21  
 
Despite this, the decision to pass legislation was not arrived at easily. Prior to the 
enactment of the TBA it had to be shown that there was a perverse problem and the 
nature of that problem had to be demonstrated. In 1888 the House of Lords set up a 
Select Committee on the Sweating System. The Committee displayed genuine 
concern about the appalling working and living conditions in the East End of London, 
and its five reports and volumes of evidence drew conclusions about the nature of 
sweating. These conclusions were accepted by subsequent investigators. During the 
next twenty years this evidence led many people to conclude that only legislation could 
deal with the harms of sweating. 
 
The Committee acknowledged that sweating was a national problem, although its 
original terms of reference referred to London’s East End, the Committee found itself 
carrying out a national inquiry. In its fifth report, reporting in 1890, the Committee 
defined sweating as ‘a rate of wages inadequate to the necessities of the workers or 
disproportionate to the work done, excessive hours of labour, and the insanitary state 
																																																						
20
 Richard Tawney, on the Trade Boards Act 1909, Towards Industrial Peace, Report of a conference 
organised by the League of Nations Union, 1927, p 19	
21
 Supra 9 
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of the houses in which the work is carried on.’22 The Committee rejected the usual 
reasons for sweating, such as the existence of middle-men along with immigrant 
workers, and claims that more general factors like ‘the inefficiency of many of the lower 
class of workers, early marriages, and the tendency of the residuum of the population 
to form a helpless community, together with a low standard of life and the excessive 
supply of unskilled labour’23 were the causes of sweating. Compared with the rigour 
of the Committee’s investigation into the problems of sweating its recommendations 
were timid to say the least. Beatrice Potter, reviewing the Committee’s Report, said it 
showed that ‘the sweater is, in fact, the whole nation’,24 but the Committee was 
incapable of making the break with the doctrine of non-interference which that 
judgement implied. As such they asked for extensions to the Factory Acts,25 more 
factory inspectors and the enforcement of existing legislation governing conditions of 
employment. However, they believed that the main remedy could not take the form of 
an Act of Parliament, for ‘when legislation has reached the limit up to which it is 
effective, the real amelioration of conditions must be due to increased sense of 
responsibility in the employer and improved habits in the employed.’26 
 
Despite the fact that the Committee could not bring itself to recommend proposals for 
legislation to fix a minimum wage, it did recommend that the work for which Parliament 
itself was responsible should not be done by sweated labour, and as a result the 
House of Commons Fair Wages Resolution 1891 was passed.27 Although the 
Committee fell far short of recommending that legislation be enacted to govern the 
wages of those employed in the sweated industries. It can, perhaps, be described as 
a watershed and as Bayliss put it ‘the first breach in the dyke’28 towards State 
intervention in wages. 
 
																																																						
22
 Select Committee on the sweating system, Fifth report (Parliamentary Papers, 1890, xvii), pp. xlii-
xliii 
23
 Supra 12, p xliii 
24
 Beatrice Potter, ‘The Lords and the Sweating System,’ The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 27, No. 160, 
June 1890, P 889 
25
 The Factory Acts were a series of laws passed to regulate the conditions of industrial employment	
26
 Supra 12, p xlv 
27
 Since 1891 the Fair Wage Resolution of the House of Commons, revised in 1909 and 1946, 
instructed Government Departments to require their contractors to comply with specified fair 
standards of wages and working conditions. In 1983, the Conservative Government revoked the 1946 
Resolution 
28
 Supra 9, p 3 
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Duncan Bythell described the work of the House of Lords Select Committee as ‘lifting 
the lid off of something highly unpleasant’.29 However, some had been writing,30 thirty 
years before the appointment of the House of Lords Select Committee in 1888, about 
poor working conditions, insanitary conditions and low pay and this would suggest that 
the problems of sweating were already well publicised before the House of Lords 
Select Committee began its work. 
 
During the next twenty years’ additional evidence about sweating came from a number 
of different sources, but it took time and argument to confirm that legislation was 
foreseeable if ‘certain standards were demanded by the public conscience.’31 The 
Royal Commission on Labour in 1894 came to the decision that the source of sweating 
lay in the handing out of work to be done at home, and even the Minority Report, to 
which the three trade unionists members; Tom Mann (Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers), William Abraham (South Wales Miners), and James Mawdesley (Cotton-
spinners) – subscribed, accepted this evaluation and saw a solution to sweating in the 
broadening of the Factory Acts to protect homeworkers. 
 
The extent of the problem was uncovered by Charles Booth, which resulted in the 
publication, between 1889 and 1903, of the seventeen volumes on The Life and 
Labour of the People of London, and Seebohm Rowntree’s Poverty: A Study of Town 
Life (1901). More popular works like R. H. Sherard’s The White Slaves of England 
(1897) and Jack London’s People of the Abyss (1902) linked together the poverty of 
working and of living conditions. However, the most decisive exposure about sweating 
was organised by the National Anti-Sweating League. On the initiative of the Daily 
News, a Sweated Industries Exhibition was held at the Royal Albert Hall in May and 
June 1906.32 It was intended to bring home to the upper and middle classes the facts 
about sweating in a much more personal way. The Exhibition received almost thirty 
thousand visitors.33 The cries that emanated from the crowds were “what can we do, 
																																																						
29
 Duncan Bythell, The Sweated Trades: Outwork in Nineteenth Century Britain (HarperCollins, 
London, 1978), p 232 
30
 For example; Henry Mayhew wrote about his observations of London’s poor in his book, London 
Labour and the London Poor (1861) 
31
 Committee on Industry and Trade (Balfour Committee), Survey of Industrial Relations, 1926, p 52	
32
 Spectator, May 5, 1906; Women’s Industrial News, June 1906, 558 
33
 Daily News, June 13, 1906 
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what can we do?”34 All of the goods exhibited were made by sweated labour, and each 
had attached figures showing the wages paid for making them along with the weekly 
amounts which workers earned.35 For over sixty years, campaigners had relied on 
images of half-starved, sweated workers to strengthen their cause and press for social 
and legal reform of this exploited group in society.36 The exhibition used actual 
workers, creating a visual spectacle. It helped, according to Blackburn, ‘to lead directly 
to Britain’s first piece of low pay legislation… the 1909 Trade Boards Act’.37 
 
Amongst those to visit the Exhibition was Canon Lyttleton, the headmaster of Eton. 
He along with the headmasters of Uppingham and Clifton were so distraught to 
discover that the racquet balls used in their schools, and displayed at the Exhibition, 
were made by sweated labour that they agreed to pay higher prices to the middle-men 
to allow higher wages to be paid.38 At the Headmasters’ Conference, in 1907, a 
Committee was established which revealed that there were forty known women 
homeworkers covering racquet balls and that their typical weekly earnings were 6s. at 
a rate of 1
!
"
 d. an hour.39 A voluntary wages board was established, broadly along the 
same lines as those which would later be established by the TBA 1909. The voluntary 
boards lacked legal enforcement and therefore it was only successful because the 
schools agreed to pay higher prices whenever the Board recommended an increase 
in wages. However, due to the voluntary nature of the arrangement the schools could 
have refused to pay extra and there would have been no remedy available. 
 
The Anti-Sweating League was born as a result of the Exhibition and triumphed with 
a combination of upper-class goodwill and head-strong scheming for sweating to be 
controlled by legislation. In October 1906 the League organised a Conference on a 
Minimum Wage. It was attended by 341 representatives from trade unions, co-
operative societies, the Independent Labour Party and the Social Democratic 
																																																						
34
 Alfred Gardiner, “Introduction” in Clementina Black, Sweated Industry and the Minimum Wage 
(London, 1907), xv 
35
 Supra 9, p 3 
36
 Sheila Blackburn, ‘“Princesses and Sweated-Wage Slaves Go Well Together”: Images of British 
Sweated Workers, 1843-1914’ [2002] 61 International Labour and Working-Class History 24-25 
37
 Supra 26, p 25 
38
 Supra 9, p 4	
39
 E Lyttleton, ‘Voluntary Wages Boards,’ The Contemporary Review, Vol 95, February 1909 
17	
	
Federation.40  Its purpose was made clear by the addresses given by a number of key 
speakers, including W. Pember Reeves,41 the High Commissioner for the State of 
Victoria. It was ‘to work towards the setting up of machinery to deal with sweating on 
lines of compulsory minimum wages in specified industries.’42 The League was the 
main body that was turning the public emotion that sweating had aroused into pressure 
on the Government for legislation. However, other bodies soon rallied to the cause. 
These included The Women’s Industrial Council, The Women’s Trade Union League 
and the Fabian Society who In the mid-1890s had coined the slogan the “national 
minimum” to describe their political and social policy of spreading previous state 
intervention regulating factory conditions and public health into, for example, wage 
determination, the duration of compulsory schooling, the need for old-age pensions, 
reform of the poor laws, the extension of workers’ compensation for industrial injuries 
and improving housing conditions.43 The Fabians issued a tract, entitled The Case for 
a Minimum Wage: A Detailed Proposal for the Abolition of Sweating.44  
 
A second indicator that the campaign for legislation was having an impact came in 
February 1908 with the creation of a Select Committee on Homework by the House of 
Commons. This Committee heard evidence from workers employed in the sweated 
trades. The witnesses made a huge impact upon the Committee. They provided it with 
factual evidence and a clear description of life as a sweated worker. The Committee, 
after hearing all of the witnesses, came down in favour of legislation. It said: 
  
Unless Parliament steps in and gives (sweated workers) the protection and support 
which legislation alone can supply, the prospects of any real improvements in their 
position and condition being brought about are very remote indeed.45  
 
Finally, it appeared to be that the conclusion reached was that the only way to protect 
sweated workers was through legislation. 
 
																																																						
40
 Supra 9, p 4 
41
 Other speakers included Sir Charles Dilke, Sidney Webb and Sir George Askwith 
42
 National Anti-Sweating League, Report on a Conference on a Minimum Wage, Held at the 
Guildhall, London, October 24-26
th
 1906, p 3 
43
 Alan McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics 1884-1918 (Cambridge 1966) 
44
 Fabian Society Tract No.128, 1907	
45
 Report of the Select Committee on Homework, House of Commons, No. 246, 1908, p xxxii 
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The Anti-Sweating League sent a commission, on the 4th December 1908, which was 
led by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Sir Charles Dilke to meet with the Prime 
Minister and other Cabinet members to put forward the case that legislation was 
needed. After the commission had been heard it was announced that a Bill would be 
presented before Parliament by the President of the Board of Trade46 Winston 
Churchill. Prior to this point it had been the responsibility of the Home Office to deal 
with all aspects of work. Churchill had recently succeeded Lloyd George at the Board 
of Trade,47 and he had argued for the delegation’s proposals that legislation was 
needed to protect those working in the sweated industries. Having got the Cabinet to 
agree to the proposals he had his own Department made responsible for the Bill.  
 
Public opinion had been steadily improving in favour of legislation since 1898, when 
Sir Charles Dilke had first introduced a private members Bill in the House of Commons. 
Dilke had introduced the Bill in each session from 1898. He had discussed the 
proposals for legal minimum wages in Victoria with Alfred Deakin, a minister in the 
Victorian Government and later Prime Minister of Australia, as early as 1887. Dilkes’s 
Bill included the main characteristics of the Victorian model. This was delegates of 
both workers and employers, along with an independent chairman. The Boards would 
make proposals that would then be legally binding on employers within that trade and 
would be enforced by inspectors. Aves was doubtful whether the system that was used 
in Victoria could be successfully exported into Britain, and was of the opinion that: 
 
The evidence does not appear to justify the conclusion that it would be advantageous 
to make the recommendations of any Special Boards that may be constituted in this 
country (Britain) legally binding.48 
 
In 1906, Dilke had the right to move his Bill on the first night available for private 
members’ Bills. However, he withdrew after he failed to secure enough support in 
Parliament. After the General Election of 1906 Labour MPs began to add their names 
to the Bill, and in 1909 the main provisions of the Bill were included in the 
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Government’s own Bill. The Bill had, at this point, such widespread support that its 
second reading was taken without a division of the House of Commons.49 
 
The most powerful emotions that lay behind the Bill were the same as those that 
underlay all social legislation of the period. The Women’s Industrial Council put is as:  
  
[T]hese people are the perplexity of our generation, and unless we are to abandon 
ourselves to despair and to give up all hope of genuine social progress we must call 
the State in to their protection and assistance.50 
 
Those in support of the Bill argued that since legislation, such as the Factory Acts, 
was used to control conditions of employment then wages could be controlled in this 
way too.  This opinion was expressed most succinctly by the Select Committee on 
Homework, where is said: 
 
It is quite as legitimate to establish by legislation a minimum standard of remuneration 
as it is to establish such a standard of sanitation, cleanliness, ventilation, air space and 
hours of work.51 
 
Those in opposition to the Bill had to show that by using the law to require an employer 
to pay a higher price for labour than would be in a free market was different from 
requiring an employer to meet with higher costs than would otherwise be by making 
him observe, for example, minimum standards in ventilation. 
 
The Trade Boards Bill was immensely different in nature to the Factory Acts by the 
directness of State intervention in wages. Minimum conditions of employment were 
part of the general nature to employment; legal minimum wages would override the 
free bargain reached between an employer and worker. Bayliss indicated that the 
nature of the Bill was never fully exposed due to the desire to deal with the issue of 
sweating.52 One observer commented that ‘for a long time many continued to deny 
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that (the Act) was an effective breach of the tradition of non-interference with the 
sanctuary of private wage negotiation.’53 
 
The economic rationale against the Bill was that wages fixed by law would be self-
defeating. By making employers pay more than labour was worth to them Lees-Smith 
put it as if: ‘the cost of labour is raised… and this will increase the probability that the 
labour hitherto earning less than the minimum will be left with employment.’54 The 
argument followed that any attempt to increase the price of labour above that that was 
determined by the market would lead to the substitution of capital for labour resulting 
in unemployment, and that if the United Kingdom was to raise the price of labour 
against that determined by the market, goods made by sweated labour in other 
countries would be imported resulting still in unemployment.55 These issues regarding 
protection versus free trade were brought into the House of Commons debate. Arthur 
Balfour, an opponent of legislation said: 
 
[T]hese wages are not fixed by competition, but it is a forced sale of value. It is not 
competition value. It is a forced sale value. It is grossly unfair of anyone to say that a 
forced sale represents the true value of the article sold. A forced sale never gives a 
true market rate of wages… Whatever your view on Protection may be, you are now 
interfering not with the fair value of wages but with the cost at which certain articles 
may be introduced… If you think that the raising of wages in this country will make the 
cost of production greater, you are driven, to the inevitable conclusion that you are 
going to hand over the trades to foreign sweated labour. You are absolutely bonnd to 
make provision to deal with that difficulty. Under this Bill the only provision you can 
make is to exclude the industry in question from the beneficent operations of this 
measure.56 
 
The Bill’s supporter’s response to this argument was to insist that sweated trades were 
exceptional in their nature and that minimum wages would only be applied to those 
workers within these trades. They argued that the state of the labour market was such 
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that some workers were paid so little that they could not afford to pay for life and that 
the employers were, therefore, receiving a subsidy from the State. Workers were part 
of the capital stock of the nation and the payment of wages insufficient to maintain 
them enabled some employers to obtain labour at a price which was less than it cost 
the community.57 This view was set out by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their 
discussion of the National Minimum.58 The Webb’s writings turned the laissez-faire 
opinions upside down. Only legislation could guarantee that labour was paid what it 
cost to provide and in its absence the community would be living on its capital. 
Unemployment, it was held, was a more desirable option to sweating. This attitude 
made the argument more influential as it met the established hostility to State 
interference on its own ground. However, by justifying legislation in this way it meant 
that legal wages could only be legislated for where workers would otherwise be 
provided with less than enough to keep ‘body and soul together.’59 The Webb’s put it 
as: 
 
The minimum wage… would be determined by practical inquiry as to the cost of food, 
clothing and shelter physiologically necessary, according to national habit and custom, 
and to prevent bodily deterioration.60 
 
Paradoxically the Bill did not define what a legal minimum wage was. The legitimacy 
of State intervention had been acknowledged. However, suspicion was so strong that 
the State itself could not be given the power to reach the actual rates that wages 
should be paid at. Instead, the role of the State on this matter was minimised, and the 
practical effects of the legislation was to be left to the representatives of the Trade 
Board. The only power that the State had was the power to enforce the decisions of 
the Boards. 
 
It was at this stage that the experiences in Victoria were so important. Aves had shown 
that both workers and employers were able to help themselves in the trades where a 
Board had been established and that the Boards were a form of industrial self-
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government.61 It was already emerging that the Boards were a means of encouraging 
voluntary collective bargaining. Churchill said: 
 
[T]he principles on which we are proceeding are to endeavour to foster in trades in 
which, by reason of the prevalence of exceptionally evil conditions, no organisation 
has yet taken root, and in which, in consequence, no parity of bargaining power can 
be said to exist.62 
 
The limitation of the State’s commitment and the implicit rejection of a national 
minimum wage highlighted the importance of the Boards, the appointment of a 
separate Board for each trade, and the limited role of the State in their operation were 
accepted without hesitation as the Bill passed through Parliament. The breach with 
the past was seen afterwards to be clear, but at the time it was the connections linking 
State regulation with the hands-off approach which were noticed. The privacy of the 
wage-bargain was at an end, but the Act did not authorise the Minister the power to 
set wages. It was limited at doing for wages what the Factory Acts had done for 
conditions – it was necessary in order to end the disease which went with the laissez-
faire approach. 
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The Trade Boards Act 1909 – Britain’s First Statute Regulating Wages  
 
The TBA 1909 came into effect on the 1st January 1910. Its passing marked a 
milestone in the development of minimum wage regulation in both Britain and 
throughout the world. The powers of the Trade Boards were limited, but they had both 
an immediate and tangible effect at raising living standards, and over the years they 
became an integral part of the system of State support for collective wage 
determination. The Wages Councils (which the Trade Boards became known as from 
1945) were eventually seen as providing only a partial solution to the problem of low 
pay. The Act made provisions that employers, operating in particular trades, must not 
pay their workers below a certain level.63 In his often quoted speech during the Bill’s 
Second Reading, Churchill, explained that the Trade Boards were necessary to 
ensure that workers received “a living wage” in industries where the bargaining 
strength of employers greatly outweighed that of the employees: 
 
It is a serious national evil that any class of His Majesty’s subjects should receive less 
than a living wage in return for their utmost exertions. It was formerly supposed that 
the workings of the laws of supply and demand would naturally regulate or eliminate 
that evil… Where in the great staple trades in the country you have a powerful 
organisation on both sides, where you have reasonable leaders able to bind their 
constituents to their decision, where that organisation is conjoint with an automatic 
scale of wages or arrangements for avoiding a deadlock by means of arbitration, there 
you have a healthy bargaining which increases the competitive power of the industry, 
enforces a progressive standard of life and the productive scale, and continually 
weaves capital and labour more closely together. But where you have what we call 
sweated trades, you have no organisation, no parity of bargaining, the good employer 
is undercut by the bad, and the bad is undercut by the worst; the worker, whose whole 
livelihood depends upon the industry, is undersold by the worker who only takes the 
trade up as a second string, his feebleness and ignorance generally renders the worker 
an easy prey to the tyranny of the masters and middle-men, only a step higher up the 
ladder than the worker, and held in the same relentless grip of forces – where those 
conditions prevail you have not a condition of progress, but a condition of progressive 
degeneration.64 
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The Act initially legislated for four trades to have a minimum wage. These were based 
on where sweating or homework was particularly prevalent. Schedule One of the Act 
identified the trades that were to be initially regulated. These were: 
 
• Ready-made and wholesale bespoke tailoring – this was a widespread national 
industry employing around 200,000 people.65 
• Paper and cardboard box making. Work was carried in many industries as well 
as within specialist firms – around 25,000 people were employed in this 
industry.66 
• Machine-made lace and net finishing, and mending or darning operations of 
lace curtain finishing – employing around 10,000 people,67 and; 
• Certain types of chain-making – employing around 3,000 people.68 
 
Trade Boards were to be made-up of equal members of representatives of employers 
and workers along with a number of independent representatives appointed by the 
Department of the Board of Trade.69 
 
The powers of the Trade Boards were strictly confined and they only had the authority 
to set minimum hourly rates of pay along with equivalent rates for piece-work within 
the trades that they operated.70 These rates were able to be fixed so as to apply to the 
whole of that trade or to any special process or to any special class of workers or to 
any specific area where the trade was carried out. Despite the limited scope of the 
trade boards powers there was evidence that suggested their effectiveness in terms 
of improving workers’ conditions within those industries.71  
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Where a trade, covered by a Trade Board, failed to pay the prescribed wage as 
established by that Board then, potentially, both a civil action to recover the loss of 
wages could be taken along with criminal charges.72 The burden of proof was reversed 
in the event of any prosecution, S 6 (4) stating that: 
 
[O]n any prosecution of an employer under this section, it shall lie on the employer to 
prove by the production of proper wage sheets or record of wages or otherwise that 
he has not paid, or agreed to pay, wages at less than the minimum rate.  
 
The Board of Trade appointed officers for the purpose of investigating complaints and 
to ensure proper compliance of the Act. These administrators had the authorisation to 
enter factories, workshops and places used for giving out work and to require the 
production of wage sheets, lists of workers, and any other relevant information. A 
number of prosecutions were brought about under the Act.  
 
The officers identified that cases of underpayment had resulted due to 
misunderstanding or carelessness when calculating the amount of wages owed to 
workers.73 Charles Verrill, identified a number of such cases where the officers 
successfully instructed the trades what they needed to do under the Act. These 
included such things as instances where: 
 
• Three workers were underpaid – arrears paid in all cases with an amount owed 
of £15 15s. 4
!
"
d. 
• The officers found that time workers were receiving minimum or above wage 
rates, and that proportion of pieceworkers who earned less than the minimum 
did not appear to be excessive. 
• Officers found three time workers had been underpaid – arrears were paid with 
a total amount owed of £2 15s. 3d. On the inspectors first visit 23% of 
pieceworkers earned less than the minimum. Piece rates were, in some cases, 
increased. On the second visit that was carried out only 10% of workers earned 
less than the minimum rates prescribed by the Board. 
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• Officers found that six time workers had been underpaid. The rates were 
corrected and arrears of £20 16s. 11d were paid. 
 
Verrill also identified that a number of proceedings had been taken against employers 
in a number of cases where breaches of the Act had been brought to the attention of 
the Board of Trade. In these cases, successful convictions were obtained.  
 
The first prosecution was that of an employer in the chain trade. He had failed to pay 
wages to three workers at the minimum rate specified by the Trade Board for that 
trade. In this case an attempt was made by the employer to conceal the violation of 
the Act by creating false entries in the wages books. The court considered that the 
offences were serious enough that they imposed fines totalling £15, with £9 9s. costs. 
In addition to this the employer was ordered to pay the three workers the arrears of 
wages which amounted to £7 15s. 10
#
$
d.74 
 
The second prosecution to take place under the Act was that of a Nottingham middle-
woman, for failing to pay workers the minimum rates indicated by the lace-finishing 
Board. The defendant was fined £1, with £1 1s. costs. The magistrates intimated that 
any future offenses would be dealt with much more severely.75 
 
The third prosecution was that of a box manufacturer from East London. He failed to 
pay a female worker the minimum rate indicted by that Board. The employer was fined 
£3 3s. with further costs of £5 5s. The magistrates also ordered him to pay the worker 
17s.76 
 
The Act’s procedures meant that, in practice, it took at least one year from the Board’s 
first meeting to bring about a legal minimum wage into effect. Each of the Boards had 
to agree, by a majority vote if necessary, minimum rates of wages and, if it wished, 
general minimum rates for piece-work. All workers and employers had to be advised 
of the Boards proposals, and during a period of three months’ any concerns could be 
lodged against the proposals. Having considered the objections, the Board then had 
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to seek approval from the President of the Board of Trade to sanction its proposals. If 
the Minister did so, then the rates became mandatory at the end of six months from 
ratification77 -  in the meantime the rates became an implied term in the worker’s 
contract. However, employers were still free to pay less if they could get their workers 
to agree. An employer could ask to have the wage rates made binding for his 
employees before the end of the six months, and an employer delivering a 
Government or a local authority contract was compelled to do so. The legal time limits 
alone, which the Board could not shorten, meant that nine months had to pass by 
between the Board’s decision to propose wage rates and their legal enforcement 
throughout that specific trade. 
 
Of the four opening trades that were specified within the Act, the slowest Trade Board 
that completed was that for tailoring. Here wage rates did not become legally binding 
until February 1912 – two years after the Act became law.78 The quickest trade to 
finalise was the Chain Board, however, here special circumstances had taken place. 
The Board had made its recommendations for the hand-hammered sections of chain-
making in May 1910. After the period of protests the rates were sanctioned in August 
1910, and were due to be legally enforceable by February 1911. When the rates 
became an implied contractual term, in August, the employers asked their workers to 
accept a lower rate. The vast majority of workers in this trade were women and had 
joined a trade union after the Board was established. The unions and workers believed 
that it was the motive of the employers to take advantage of cheap labour during the 
six-month period before the wage rates become legally binding as a means to 
stockpile chain. As a result, they refused the request of their employers. The 
employers then locked the workers out, and only at the beginning of October did the 
lock-out end with the employers accepting the rates as mandatory without waiting for 
them to become the law. The time rate for women in chain-making was set by the 
Board at 3
!
"
d. per hour – the average working week, which the Board had no control 
over, was 54 hours. This gave a weekly income of 15s. Rent at the time was around 
3s. 9d. which meant that the legal minimum wage, for chain-making, was around 11s. 
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3d. This compared well when considered against what weekly earnings were prior to 
the Board had been, between 5s. and 6s.79  
 
The criteria for judging which trades were eligible for a legal minimum wage were 
vaguely drawn up in the Act. It stated: 
  
That the rate of wages prevailing in any branch of the trade is exceptionally low, as 
compared with that in other employments, and that the other circumstances of the 
trade are such as to render the application of this Act to the trade expedient.80 
 
The understanding was that conditions associated with sweating, of which low pay 
was one of, justified the creation of a Trade Board. The initiative to establish such a 
Board rested with the President of the Board of Trade. He was able to make a 
Provisional Order, however, any such Order needed the approval of the House of 
Commons.  This procedure meant that although the Minister was responsible for 
identifying whether or not a particular trade was sweated, he had to get the Commons 
to agree in order for a Trade Board to be established.81 There was only one occasion 
when this procedure was used. In 1913 five new Trade Boards were created. These 
were in the following trades: 
 
• Sugar confectionary – employing around 80,000 workers.82 
• Shirt-making – employing around 50,000 workers.83 
 
These two trades were large national trades employing mainly women. 
 
• Hallow-ware – employing around 15,000 workers. This was split between the 
Tin Box trade and the Hallow-ware trades.84 
• The Cotton and Linen Embroidery trade – employing around 5,000 workers 
(this trade was limited to Ireland).85 
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Further evidence of the inclination of the State to regulate wages through the use of 
legislation came with the enactment of the Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act 1912. 
The TBA 1909 had been enacted to safeguard the most vulnerable workers in society, 
the Act of 1912 served to protect a group of workers who, at this stage, were amongst 
the most highly protected of workers. This Act, just like the TBA 1909, did not result in 
the State setting the minimum rates of pay. There was an absence of want on the part 
of the Government to influence what the applicable rates of pay should be. It was 
provided in the Act that nothing was to prejudice the operation of any agreement 
entered into, or custom existing, before the passing of the legislation, for the payment 
of wages at a higher rate.86 The Act also specified that it was to be an implied term of 
every miner’s contract of employment that he be paid a minimum wage fixed under 
it.87 The minimum rates of pay for miner’s was, like the wage rates established for the 
trades where a Trade Board operated, determined by joint boards for each mining 
district. An independent chairman was appointed with the agreement of both sides. If 
the parties could not agree then the Board of Trade would make the appointment. The 
rates of pay that were reached could be amended at any time by understanding 
between the delegates on the Board. In addition to this, either side was able to apply 
for a variation after one year, provided that three months’ notice had been given after 
the year had passed.88 
 
The 1912 Act was enacted due to a national miner’s strike. The Government had 
intervened in an attempt to prevent the strike but was unsuccessful and subsequently 
the strike began in March of that year. The operation of the Act appeared to have had 
a positive impact on the earnings of those miners who were affected by it. Jevons, in 
his writings identified that in terms of increasing wages the Act was a success: 
 
It has been found by experience that this Act, which is nominally only temporary, does 
secure to the hewers a substantial minimum of day wages, however un-remunerative 
their conditions of work; and the fixing of rates by the joint Boards has, on the whole, 
considerably increased the wages of the various grades of the less skilled workers.89 
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The Act also did little to damage collective bargaining within the sector. Bercusson 
saying that: 
 
The machinery set up under the Act is still in existence and is still used, but the 
resulting minimum rates have been effective only to a limited extent owing to their 
having been fixed generally at a lower level then the operative rates arranged from 
time to time as the result of collective bargaining.90 
 
The 1912 Act appeared not to come under the same criticism that the TBA 1909 and 
the Trade Boards Act 1918 (TBA 1918) would subsequently come under. 
 
At the outbreak of the First World War, in 1914, none of the Trade Boards that had 
been formed in 1913 had a legal minimum wage in place. With the exception of women 
workers, employed in the tailoring trade, all minimum wage rates were replaced by 
wages established by the Tribunals that were formed under the Munitions Acts of 1916 
and 1917.91 Although the Government was very careful not give the President of the 
Board of Trade the power to set the rate of wages under the TBA 1909, statutory 
powers introduced in 1916 brought the State into the business of fixing actual rates of 
pay.92 Section 6 of the Munitions of War (Amendment) Act 1916 provided that: 
 
Where female workers were employed on, or in connection with munitions work the 
Minister of Munitions Should have the power by Order to give direction as to the rate 
of wages, or as to hours of labour, or conditions or employment of the female workers 
so employed. 
 
Section 7 provided for a similar authority with regards to semi-skilled and unskilled 
men employed, in any controlled establishment, on munitions work being work of a 
class which, prior to the war, was typically carried out by skilled labour.93 Any breach 
of an Order declared under either section 6 or section 7 was a criminal offence. Both 
of these measure were brought forward as a result of trade union pressure. The 
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powers contained within section 6 were also used in response to the problems posed 
by women doing work which was thought to be ‘men’s work’. The Minister issued a 
Statutory Instrument (SI) to set wage rates for munitions work.94 The Order quantified 
time and piece rates along with bonus payments. Endorsement of the Order was 
inspired by the: 
 
Need to recruit women for munitions work away from their homes, and to the sense 
that the Government should be a model employer directly and indirectly, or should at 
least secure a reasonable wage to workers from whom the leaving certificate 
regulations removed in the public interest the power to move freely from ill-paid 
occupations.95 
 
The stumbling block for Parliament was that there were no fair-wage models in the 
different districts because the work was never embarked upon before and, no standard 
existed to apply to in the situation of female workers. It was questionable whether 
collective bargaining would provide the standards required as it would have been 
unlikely to have regulated the terms and conditions of employment of occupations 
which were not usually carried out by men. As such, a section 6 Order was used to fill 
this gap. A Statutory Instrument was also issued to deal with the issue of additional 
payments with regards to overtime.96 The regulation sought to make use of current 
standards where relevant standards could be invoked; such standards might, but 
would not necessarily, be collectively agreed. The Order provided that: 
 
Where no custom providing for such additional payments exist in the establishment, 
such additional payments shall be made at the rates and on the conditions prevailing 
in similar establishments or trades in the district. Where there are no similar 
establishments or trades in the district, the rates and conditions prevailing in the 
nearest district in which the general industries are similar shall be adopted.97 
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As a last resort the amounts would be set by the State: 
 
In the absence of any custom prevailing in the establishment, or in the district, or 
elsewhere, such additional payments shall be made at such rates and on such 
conditions as the Minister of Munitions may direct.98 
 
Orders that were made under the Munitions of War (Amendment) Act 1916 involved a 
radical withdrawal from what the Government’s aim was with the TBA 1909. The State 
was now defining actual wage rates. Such a process involved: 
 
An elaborated administrative organisation, comprising not only a central department 
issuing the Orders, but local agents to enquire into questions of applications, and, 
some judicial authority to decide on disputed cases.99 
 
Additional law reform relating to wages came about with the enactment of the 
Munitions of War Act 1917. Section 1 of the Act sought to settle the issues that were 
caused by the position of skilled workers who, at this point during the war, may have 
found themselves at a financial drawback when assessed to semi-skilled workers that 
were paid at the piece rate. Section 1 sanctioned the Minister to give directions relating 
to the remuneration that was paid to time workers on munitions work where the 
Minister considered that it was necessary in order to preserve the productivity of 
munitions. As with Orders issued under Sections 6 and 7 of the 1916 Act, Section 1 of 
the 1917 Act involved a process whereby the Government set the actual wage rate, a 
major departure from the TBA 1909. Orders issued under Section 1 were seen as 
crucial as they enabled the Government to discourage skilled workers from leaving 
their employment by setting higher wage rates.  
 
The effect of the TBA 1909 on wages before 1914 was minimal. Unquestionably, 
women workers affected by the first four Boards benefitted considerably, but the scope 
of the Act had not gone beyond the tentative stage when the Great War began. 
Sweated workers were many times more numerous than the half million that were 
shielded by the Trade Boards in 1914. However, regardless of the fact that the Act 
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was of no great practical importance in its first years, it did embody the ideologies of 
statutory wage regulation on which the general system on minimum wage legislation 
in the United Kingdom was to be taken. 
 
The Trade Boards Act 1918 – The Second Stage 
 
By 1918 the Government was moving towards exercising a much wider control over 
wage increases. It was beginning to be of the opinion that they could only exercise 
effective control over wages ‘if they were empowered to control wages completely’.100 
 
The experiences during the War of the national wage settlement, along with State 
enforcement led to an explosion of proposals for the governing of industrial relations 
on a national scale. The extension of collective bargaining and the increase in trade 
union membership that this brought, coupled with the assertion of the community’s 
interest through Government action, acted together as the starting-gun for post-war 
plans. The Whitley Committee’s Report brought together the main ideas of the period, 
and Trade Boards played a large role in the Committee’s plans for industrial relations 
in the United Kingdom. Some of the proposals along with some of the 
recommendations made by other bodies, such as the Industrial Conference which was 
set-up by the Government in 1919, called for State action that went beyond those 
covered by the Trade Boards. Out of these plans the only one to really survive was an 
expansion of the Trade Boards. National schemes of wage negotiation along with the 
idea of a national minimum wage had failed to make it through the post-war slump.  
 
John Whitley101 was appointed to chair a Committee to report on ‘The Relations of 
Employers and Employees,’ known as the Whitley Committee.102 It was established in 
1916, as was the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1917.103  It 
was given the following terms of reference: 
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[1] To make and consider suggestions for securing a permanent improvement in the 
relations between employers and workmen. (2) To recommend means for securing 
that industrial conditions affecting the relations between employers and workmen shall 
be systematically reviewed by those concerned, with a view to improving conditions in 
the future.104  
 
The Committee was made up of employers and trade union officials, along with 
economists and social workers. The Committee was keen to stress the benefits that 
could be achieved by both sides of industry co-operating: 
 
[T]he feature which gives the Whitley scheme a definite place in the history of industrial 
relations, lies in the emphasis placed on the community of interest of all engaged in 
the industry.105   
 
At the end of the First World War the Government was of the mind that it would be 
foolish to allow wartime wage controls to expire immediately. As a result, it enacted 
the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act 1918. The Act maintained the levels of wages, 
although the Minister of Labour let it be known that ‘the Government are particularly 
anxious to encourage each industry to deal with wages and allied questions for itself 
as soon as practicable.’106  
 
The Committee brought into effect one aspect of the Trade Boards which had 
previously been in the background. It was more concerned with their possibilities as 
precursors of collective bargaining than with their function as suppressors of sweating. 
In the Committee’s scheme of things, the ideal was a universal system of Joint 
Industrial Councils (JICs) resting on trade unions and employers’ associations. It was 
identified that some industries were already capable of supporting JICs, others could 
do so with some encouragement as they already had effective organisation on both 
sides and the rest would need a Trade Board.107 The opinion of the Committee was 
that there should be ‘two classes of industry… industries with Industrial Councils and 
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industries with Trade Boards.’108 The Boards were to be substitutes for voluntary 
collective bargaining until both employers and employees were in a strong enough 
position to do so without aid. They were intended to only be ‘a temporary expedient 
facilitating organisation within the industry, so that, in the course of time, the workers 
or the employers will not have need of the statutory regulations.’109 
 
Compared with the very limited purpose of the Boards that were envisaged under the 
TBA 1909, this proposal was intended to transform their status. The Committee liked 
the makeup of the Boards’ representative structure along with the similarity of their 
proceedings to those of voluntary negotiating bodies. The Committee wanted the 
Boards to be an expression of the community’s desire to foster the practice of 
collective bargaining in trades which could not support it unaided. They envisaged the 
Boards as being the Embryo of JICs. 
 
The process of growth and development which would render the Boards redundant 
was one which led the Committee to envisage circumstances in which it would be 
difficult to distinguish clearly between a JIC and a Board. For example, the Committee 
recommended that if one part of a trade was outside the scope of a JIC then the 
Minister should either set up a Board, which would include members of the JIC, for 
that part of the trade, or should give the JIC the powers of a Board. The Committee 
went so far in emphasising all the ways in which the Boards could be made similar to 
voluntary JICs that the Ministries of Labour and Reconstruction had to publish a joint 
Memorandum on Industrial Councils and Boards.110 The Memorandum made it clear 
that ‘the purpose, structure and functions of Industrial Councils and Trade Boards are 
fundamentally different.’ The Committee was able to get its main recommendations 
turned into legislation through the Trade Boards Act 1918. The absence of voluntary 
negotiations was made the chief test for the need of a Board. 
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This new legislation gave the Minister of Labour the authority to set up a Board in any 
trade where: 
 
No adequate machinery exists for the effective regulation of wages throughout the 
trade, and that accordingly, having regard to the rate of wages prevailing in the trade, 
or any part of the trade, it is expedient that the Act should apply.111  
 
While the Committee’s concern was to concentrate legislative attention on the 
methods of wage settlement – the main requirement, in practice, was the need to 
protect the weakest workers against sweating – the same aims as the TBA 1909. In 
order to prevent a collapse in confidence in the future of national wage settlements, 
the Government made the wage rates payable at the Armistice legally enforceable for 
six months.112  This was extended until the end of September 1920. In the Committee’s 
first Report it had been predicted that the Government would give legal backing to JIC 
agreements.113  
 
In 1919 both the Provisional Joint Committee to the Industrial Conference and the War 
Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry suggested that all workers, not only those 
covered by Trade Boards, should be ensured a minimum wage by law. The 
broadening of the Trade Boards was seen by the Government as a means of 
weakening the pressure for a national legal minimum. The Boards were acknowledged 
as second best by those who wanted a national minimum wage for all. The Industrial 
Conference’s Committee urged that until there was a national minimum wage that 
Trade Boards should be founded in all of the less organised trades. The Woman’s 
Employment Committee of the Ministry of Reconstruction, in 1917, had determined 
that of the two million women working in industry after the Great War 350,000 would 
be covered by existing Trade Boards, and that a further million would require the 
protection of such Boards. On this size the Trade Boards system would have taken on 
an entirely new magnitude in wage determination. 
 
The TBA 1918 not only laid down new benchmarks for the establishment of Trade 
Boards, but it also provided a much simpler and quicker administrative procedure for 
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their creation. New Boards were to be established using the Special Order 
procedure;114 the Minister would release a draft Order, allow forty days for any 
complaints to be lodged, and then if Parliament did not dissolve the Order, the Board 
would be established.115 This same procedure applied for abolishing existing Boards. 
The Minister could, if he desired, hold a public inquiry before establishing or abolishing 
any Trade Board. In this way any decisions about the expansion of the Trade Boards 
system passed in the hands of the Minister. 
 
The formula for changes in minimum wages was streamlined and the six months’ 
period of implied terms of contracts was brought to an end. Once the Board had issued 
its proposals, two months (previously three), were allowed for any concerns to be 
recorded. The Minister was allowed a month to decide whether or not to authorise the 
proposals. The rate fixing powers of the Trade Boards were extended. Minimum time 
rates remained the only rates which were mandatory, but in addition to permissive 
powers over general minimum piece rates, the Boards were enabled to set overtime 
rates since they had the power to shape what the ‘normal numbers of hours of work 
per week or for that day’116 were. The Boards were also able to settle guaranteed time 
rates for piece workers. As a result, the new powers of the Boards were made similar 
to that of voluntary collective bargaining bodies. 
 
The establishment of new Trade Boards got off to a rather slow start. Only two were 
created in the first half of 1919. The time limit on the legal enforcement of war time 
wages, along with the Government’s resistance to lasting national legal minimum 
wages, eventually resulted in a huge expansion of the Trade Boards system. By the 
end of 1920 there were around three million workers and 300,000 employers that were 
covered by the Trade Board system. According to Bayliss’s study around 70 per cent 
of the workers that were covered by a Trade Board were women.117 The chief trades 
in which Boards were established were jute and flax manufacturing, laundries, milk 
distribution, boot and shoe repairing and tobacco manufacturing.118 
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In 1919 the Government announced that it intended to form Trade Boards for retailing 
and in 1920 two Boards for the grocery and provision trades were set up. Many of the 
newly created Trade Boards encompassed smaller trades such as toy manufacturing, 
button making and cotton and general waste salvage. 
 
By 1921 the Ministry of Labour was completing preparations for a major expansion of 
the Trade Boards programme. By September of that year Special Orders were made 
by the Minister for Trade Boards to cover the sale of poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, 
glowers along with hairdressing trades. Notices were also issued of the intention for 
the Acts to apply to the optical industry, jute, flax and hemp finishing and the meat 
distribution industry. This huge increase in the number of Trade Boards meant that the 
administration of the system became a major focus of the work for the Ministry of 
Labour.119 
 
Plans for further expansion of Trade Boards depended on the continuation of the post-
war economic boom. As soon as that boom ceased it became noticeable that an effect 
of the Boards was to impose a delay on the employers’ power to reduce wages. For 
industries where no Trade Board existed, in times of increased unemployment, those 
employees had no protection at all against an employer who wished to lower wages 
straight away. Bayliss, identified in his book British Wages Councils,120 that although 
the downward pressure on wage rates began in the autumn of 1920, Trade Board 
minimum rates for men did not begin to decline until May 1921, and that the decline 
was at a much more glacial pace than either wage rates in those industries where no 
Trade Board existed, or than prices.121 With these new economic circumstances the 
mood of industrial relations shifted, and the establishment of new Boards simply 
ceased. 
 
Despite the queries and the research that had already been made for the creation of 
new Boards, the Government simply ended the expansion of the system. Whereas 23 
																																																						
119
 The Ministry estimated that there were another two million workers in sixty trades to whom, on the 
same grounds as the Trade Boards already established, legal minimum wage regulation should apply. 
The objective was, therefore, a Trade Board system covering around five million workers and half a 
million employers, consisting of around 100 Boards  
120
 Supra 9, p 18-19 
121
 Dorothy Sells, British Wages Boards, A Study in Industrial Democracy, (1
st
 Edn, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington DC, 1939), pp 270-277 
39	
	
Trade Boards were created in 1920, in 1921 this had diminished to just 3. Thomas 
Macnamara, in April 1921, described the situation as ‘desirable in the present 
circumstances to proceed with caution in the establishment of new Trade Boards.’122 
As unemployment began to rise the prospects for all of the schemes for strengthening 
collective bargaining along with the legal protection for wages began to disappear.  
 
JICs would only remain effective whilst both trade unions and employers found it to be 
worthwhile for them to operate, whereas Trade boards had a permanent existence. A 
shift in the bargaining power of employers was not, in itself, enough to bring about the 
abolition of a Trade Board. It was this permanence and the inflexibility of the Trade 
Boards which lured attacks from employers during the latter half of 1921. Employers 
had wanted to lower wage rates in trades where Boards existed, as they were doing 
in trades without Boards, but they discovered that the Boards were standing in their 
way and they were unable to do so. Under the leadership of the Association of British 
Chambers of Commerce a campaign was organised to amend the TBA 1918. 
 
Some employers were pressing for the abolition of Trade Boards altogether, however, 
the general consensus was that single national minimum rates should be abolished, 
and that employers should be given the freedom to settle rates of pay with their own 
employees. For example, Bayliss identified that: 
  
It was proposed that wages should be fixed for districts, that it should be possible for 
Boards to change rates faster, and that if employers and workers agreed on a rate 
lower that the Board rate then it should replace the rate specified by the Board.123 
 
The Minister gave in to the critics of the Trade Board system and in September 1921 
he appointed a committee124, chaired by Viscount Cave,125 to ‘inquire into the working 
effects of Trade Boards Act and to report what changes, if any, are required’. The 
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Trade Boards system was put on trial at the point when it became under the most 
strain. 
 
The conclusion drawn to by the Cave Committee was that the TBA 1918 had 
unjustifiably extended the degree of State interference in the settlement of wages and 
that as a result, drastic amendments were necessary.  
 
The view that was held by the Cave Committee on the purpose of statutory wage 
regulation differed from the views that had been formed by the Whitley Committee. 
Trade Boards had been created with the view that they would evolve into voluntary 
bodies for the settlement of wages. The Cave Committee was of the opinion that: 
 
While the coercive powers of the State, and particularly the criminal law, may be 
properly used to prevent the unfair oppression of individuals and the injury of the 
national health that results from sweating of workers, the use of those coercive powers 
should be limited to that purpose and that any further regulation of wages should be 
left to the process of negotiation and collective bargaining.126 
 
It was grasped from this general slant, as it followed from the Webb’s argument for a 
national minimum wage,127 that Trade Boards should only involve themselves with 
stamping out sweating, and that the law should only be used to compel employers to 
pay their workers a wage that was sufficient for existence. The Committee made two 
central proposals. These were that Trade Boards should only be established where is 
could be shown that sweating exists, and that the Boards should only have the 
statutory power to set a rate no greater than that needed for subsistence. In order to 
give effect to its first recommendation the Committee proposed that the conditions that 
were laid out in both the TBA 1909 and 1918 should be present before a Board was 
created. This meant that ‘exceptionally low’128 wages and ‘no adequate machinery for 
the effective regulation of wages’129 would have to exist together. Bayliss suggests 
that there could be no situation in which low wages could be accompanied by 
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adequate collective bargaining and that the Committee’s recommendation amounted 
to a simple sweating criterion and a return to the TBA 1909.130  
 
The Committee’s determination on the existence of low wages was intended to remove 
all possibility of Boards being established just because of the lack of voluntary 
dialogues between employer and employee. It was rejected, by the Committee, the 
view that Trade Boards were potentially part of the national system of collective 
bargaining and: 
  
Sought to lop off the accretions that have grown upon the original Trade Boards Act of 
1908, and not to extend direct legal interference with wages beyond classes or 
workpeople who are, in popular language, sweated, or liable to be sweated.131 
 
The Committee’s second suggestion sought to go one step further and go back on the 
provisions of the TBA 1909. One of the principles that was laid down by the 1909 Act 
was that a Trade Board exercised all of its powers, whether mandatory or permissive, 
in the same way, and in the name of the entire Board. The Boards were obliged to set 
time rates and had the option, if so inclined, to set piece rates. The rates were decided 
by a popular vote of the Board and the levels set would be defended by the criminal 
law. In setting time rates a Board was able to distinguish between classes of workers, 
and were able to take into account whatever factors seemed relevant at the time. The 
Committee was of the mind that a Board should only set a rate of pay which would 
cover the cost of subsistence only. It suggested that this rate alone should be settled 
by a majority vote of the Board and enforced by the criminal law and that all other 
rates: 
 
Should be determined by agreement by the two sides of the Trade Board without the 
vote of the Chairman or Appointed Members, and when confirmed should be 
enforceable by civil proceedings only.132 
 
These proposals, which were inherent in the view that the Boards’ function was to 
prevent sweating, would, according to Bayliss, have had two outcomes if put into 
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practice. In order to establish the subsistence, wage the Boards would have had to 
have been given a definition of subsistence, and the closer that definition the less room 
for argument between the representative members – the Board would have become 
administrators of a statutory subsistence wage for sweated workers.133 All similarities 
between the Boards and collective bargaining would therefore have simply ceased. 
 
Bayliss indicates that the second consequence would have been that in all but a limited 
number of cases no other rates other than the subsistence minimum, called ‘the true 
minimum’ by the Committee, would have been settled. Deprived of their vote on wages 
other than ‘the true minimum’ the independent members would have been deprived of 
their power to bring the Boards to decisions, and without adequate trade union 
organisation the workers would have no means of getting the employers to enter into 
negotiations with them.134 
 
Other recommendations were made by the Committee with the aim of reducing the 
impact of the decisions made by the Boards on a trade. The Committee suggested 
that the Minister should have the powers, in certain trades, to create District 
Committees with the powers to establish local wage rates and thereby ending national 
minimum wages. The Committee also wanted to reduce the participation of trade 
unions in the work of a Board by implementing a rule that three out of four workers’ 
representatives should have worked within that trade. 
 
There can be no doubt that the pressures of the time helped the Committee arrive at 
the conclusion that the powers of the Boards needed to be reduced. The opposition of 
employers to the Boards, the rapidity with which wages outside the Trade Board 
system were falling, and the general withdrawal of the Government from responsibility 
for maintaining the level of wages, all served to make the Committee hostile to the 
system. Those members of the Committee who held a minority opinions could do little 
to temper its recommendations. There was no Minority Report and even the two 
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members of the General Council of the Trade Union Congress who served on the 
Committee135 signed off on its report. 
 
The Committee’s recommendations were accepted by the Government and a plan to 
introduce new legislation implementing these recommendations was announced. The 
Government also issued a statement of policy136 which set out the administrative 
means which that the Government would adopt in order to implement the Committee’s 
recommendations which did not require any fresh legislation. Since the TBA 1918 left 
it to the pleasure of the Minister for deciding whether a new Board should be created, 
it followed that he could follow the suggestions of the Committee and simply cease to 
create any new Trade Boards.  
 
Contained within the Government’s statement were details indicating that no new 
Boards would be established without their first having been a public inquiry where it 
could be shown that both ‘unduly low wages and no adequate machinery for the 
regulation of wages existed’. The 1918 Act permitted the Minister to hold a public 
inquiry if he so desired and since he was able to interpret the phrase ‘having regard to 
the rates of wages’ conveyed in the Act as meaning ‘unduly low wages’ the 
Government was able to execute the first recommendation of the Committee without 
the need for fresh legislation. 
 
The second recommendation that subsistence rates of pay should be decide on at and 
administered in the manner set out in the TBA 1918 and that other rates should only 
be by agreement between employer and employee and could only be enforced by civil 
proceedings, did necessitate new legislation. The Minister did as much as he could 
within the limits of the existing law to instigate the recommendations. In the 
Government’s statement he said that he hoped that the Boards would only propose 
rates other than the minima where there was agreement between the two sides, and 
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that ‘the Minister in confirming rates would bear the recommendations of the Cave 
Committee in this respect in mind’.137 
 
The Government introduced a Trades Boards Bill in the House of Commons, but the 
Bill had only had its first reading by the time that the Government called a General 
Election in 1923. It was seen that the Bill went one step further than the suggestions 
that were made by the Committee. It provided for autonomous District Boards in all of 
the trades at the discretion of the Minister. Because a large quantity of the proposals 
made by the Committee did not need new legislation the Bill was not deemed to be 
urgent. The Conservatives lost the 1923 election and it saw the return of the first 
Labour Government. They put a stop to the Bill, and when the Conservatives were 
returned to power in 1924 the Bill was not introduced again and none of its proposals 
were not adopted. 
 
The experiment with the TBA 1909 had shown that intervention by the State was 
compatible within a principally voluntary system of wage settlements. At the time when 
State intervention was being debated many suggested for a more direct approach with 
an introduction for a national minimum wage, guaranteeing all workers a legal 
minimum rate. However, these ideas were not adopted and the system of Trade 
Boards were employed. The Trade Boards system literally put the power of the State 
behind the decisions of the representatives on a Board. The Boards began, after the 
First World War, to be generally accepted as the State’s contribution to the bargaining 
between unions and employers’ associations as the means of settling wages. Once 
again a call for a national minimum wage was rejected. The intention was that:  
 
No longer were the Trade Boards solely designed to operate in cases of glaring 
exploitation, but henceforward they would be a normal method of supplementing 
voluntary collective bargaining.138 
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Chapter 2  
The Australian and New Zealand Systems 
 
Introduction 
 
The model which minimum wage legislation in the United Kingdom is based upon are 
to be found in the history of the movement in the State of Victoria (Australia) and New 
Zealand. Investigations were carried out in Australia and New Zealand during the 
1880s and 1890s. These investigations discovered that, despite the abundance of 
land and relative lack of labour there was a problem with excessive sweating. 
However, unlike in Britain, Australia had been prepared to use State intervention to 
help alleviate the problems associated with sweating. New Zealand opted for a 
different approach to combat sweating. Here the courts of arbitration were used. The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894 was originally enacted to prevent 
strikes and lockouts. The Act gave legal recognition to unions and enabled them to 
take disputes to a Conciliation Board. These Boards consisted of elected members, 
elected by both employee and employer. If the decision of the Board was not 
satisfactory to the parties, then an appeal could be made to the Arbitration Court. The 
court consisted of a Supreme Court judge and two assessors. The assessors 
represented the employers’ association and one from the unions. By 1898 local courts 
of arbitration were also permitted to fix wages for low-paid workers. 
 
The State of Victoria (Australia) 
 
In the Victoria wage regulation was embodied in the Factory and Shops Act 1896, 
following a campaign by the Victoria Anti-Sweating League. This allowed for the 
creation of Wages Boards which could regulate wages, hours and conditions of 
employment. The law was intended as a temporary measure, been in force until 1st 
January 1900. The Act was re-enacted on the 20th February 1900, again as a 
temporary measure – lasting for two years. In June 1900 a Royal Commission was 
also established to look at the issue of sweating and wages.  
 
The Australian Act set a minimum rate of 2s. 6d per week for those working in a factory 
or a shop. It also gave the Governor the power to appoint Special Boards to fix legal 
minimum wages. These Boards were able to set occupation specific, age specific and 
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gender specific minimum rates of pay. Initially, six trades that were believed to be 
acutely prone to sweating were established. These were in the boot, bread, clothing, 
furniture, shirts and underclothing trades. Later changes were made to the law to 
increase the scope of the legislation. This, essentially, allowed for the creation of a 
Special Board for practically any trade. Between 1900 and 1902 an additional 31 
Special Boards were created, and by 1913 there were 126 Special Boards – covering 
roughly 110,000 workers.139 
 
The events in Victoria, with minimum wages, were observed with interest by 
Australian, American and British economists, social reformers and civil servants. Many 
of whom visited Victoria to witness first-hand the working of the law.140 Many of the 
witnesses deemed the Factory and Shops Act 1896 as having successfully increased 
the wages of the low paid, whilst causing little economic harm to the employers. The 
social reformer and future United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated 
that the law ‘had created much better conditions in industry than had existed prior to 
its (the Acts) passage.’141 Sidney Webb, wrote: 
 
[I]n the sweated trades to which the law was first applied, wages have gone up, the 
hours of labour have invariably been reduced, and the actual number of persons 
employed, far from falling, has in all cases, relatively to the total population, greatly 
increased.142 
 
A thorough study of the Victoria wages system was carried out by the American 
economist and vice chairman of the Industrial Commission of Ohio, M. B. Hammond. 
He spent six months in Victoria between 1911 and 1912 studying the Special Boards 
and carrying out interviews with both workers and employers. He concluded that the 
main effects of the Factory and Shops Act 1896 were higher wages for many of the 
workers where a Special Board was in operation, and the virtual abolition of sweating 
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along with general improvements in industrial relations.143 He also examined a number 
of potentially negative effects of minimum wages and concluded that the Factory and 
Shops Act 1896 caused only minimal substitution between different types of workers, 
unemployment of older and slower workers, and relocation of business to other 
Australian States. Even the initial leader of the employers’ opposition to the Act, the 
boot manufacturer Sir Frederick Sargood, said in 1900: 
  
… that there are a large number of trades that, rightly or wrongly, believe that it would 
be to their interest – and I am speaking now more of the employers than the employees 
– to come under the Factory and Shops Act 1896.144 
 
New Zealand 
 
New Zealand was the first country to pass a law providing a means for fixing a legal 
minimum wage. This was done through the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1894. The Act gave legal recognition to Trade Unions and allowed them to take 
disputes to a Conciliation Board. The Board’s membership was made up of people 
elected by both workers and employers. Where the parties did not agree with a 
decision made by the Board they were able to appeal to the Arbitration Court which 
was made up of a Supreme Court judge and two assessors. One elected by unions 
and the other by employers’ associations. The 1966 Encyclopaedia of New Zealand 
stated that ‘After some 70-years of operation the system of industrial conciliation and 
arbitration has become firmly accepted – perhaps even a traditional – way of 
determining minimum wage rates and handling industrial disputes…’145 
 
In 1906 the then leader of the UK Labour Party, Ramsay MacDonald, visited New 
Zealand to study the arbitration system. MacDonald was not impressed, saying ‘Trade 
unions in New Zealand exist mainly to get an award out of the Arbitration Court… They 
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cannot strike; it is no good their grumbling; they simply pay their fees into union funds 
because they are legally bound to do so.’146 
 
In the end, the UK Government opted for a system similar in nature to that used in 
Australia. Where Boards would set rates for their own specific industry and the 
industries where Boards should be established would be decided by the relevant 
Minister. 
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Chapter 3  
The Wages Councils Act 1945 & The Catering Wages Act 1943 
 
“We have renamed the Trade Boards Wages Councils… Many people might ask what 
is in a name, but as the purpose of the Bill is unfolded it will be seen that the change 
in the name not only widens Trade Board legislation, but is a declaration by Parliament 
that the conception of what was known as sweated industry is past…” (Ernest Bevin)147 
 
The potentialities of the TBA 1918 were never fully exploited and in the economic 
depression of the inter-war years the Trade Board system, so far as becoming a 
means of protecting the wages of a greater number of workers, was fortunate to have 
survived. As a result of this experience the Catering Wages Act 1943 and the Wages 
Councils Act 1945 were passed. Apart from their significance as instruments for 
extending the system of wage regulation, they were devised by Ernest Bevin to 
prevent statutory wage regulation form being kicked into the long grass when it was 
needed the most, as it had been during the 1920s. This chapter will examine the 
reasons behind the enactment of these key pieces of legislation and the effects that 
they had upon wages within the United Kingdom. This chapter will conclude by 
exploring the policy reasons behind the final abolition of the Wages Councils. 
 
Ernest Bevin148 had argued that statutory wage regulation was essential if Britain was 
to avoid the destructive effects of unemployment and disruption to collective 
bargaining. The next major changes to took place affecting wages happened after the 
Second World War. The General Election of 1945 was held less than two months after 
VE Day and was the first to be held since 1935. The Labour Party, which had 
campaigned and promised to create full employment, a tax-funded National Health 
Service, the embracing of Keynesian economic policies and a cradle-to-the-grave 
welfare system. The Party’s election slogan was ‘Let us Face the Future’.149 
 
The new Government introduced a wave of legislation aimed at strengthening the 
rights of workers, tackling low pay and had adopted the proposals made in the Social 
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Insurance and Allied Services Report, 150 written by Sir William Beveridge. The 
proposals that were made in the Beveridge Report and subsequently passed into law 
became what is now regarded as the beginnings of the Welfare State.151 
 
In 1943 the Catering Wages Act was passed and by 1945 the Government had 
enacted the Wages Councils Act.152 153 This piece of legislation repealed the existing 
Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918.154 It replaced the Trade Boards with Wages 
Councils.155 According to Bayliss the Wages Councils Act 1945 was based on: 
 
The premise that the state should use its powers not simply to ameliorate the effects 
of sweating but to keep collective bargaining going when economic circumstances 
tended to destroy it.156  
 
Blackburn explains that the re-naming of the boards indicated a return to the principles 
of the 1918 Act (which stressed lack of collective bargaining machinery), along with 
the desire to remove the stigma that was associated with sweating.157 
 
The Catering Wages Act 1943 
 
In 1943 Bevin had brought forward a Bill to regulate wages in the catering industry. 
This was something that the second Labour Government (1929-1931) had 
unsuccessfully embarked upon. The Bill had some immediate aims – if working 
conditions in the industry were not improved then workers would leave the industry 
and that would have a detrimental effect upon the war effort. In introducing the Bill, the 
Government was primarily concerned with general social policy. Bevin made that 
argument that: 
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The Government takes the view unanimously, as a fixed policy, that it is our duty to 
encourage in every way we can self-government in industry wherever we can, but 
where we cannot, not to leave these people unprotected.158 
 
Such a general policy meant that all industries which could not sustain voluntary 
collective bargaining ought to have statutory wage regulations imposed upon them. 
 
Bevin dealt with catering as a separate issue than with other trades which followed 
with the Wages Councils Act 1945. This was done for various different reasons. Bevin 
knew that there would be a great many people that would be hostile to the 
implementation of legal minimums within the catering trade. He said, ‘I was told from 
the beginning, before I produced the Bill at all, that I was going to be fought to the 
death.’159 
 
Catering was quite a complex trade. It included such things as international hotels and 
boarding houses, public houses and snack bars, and there was heavy resistance to 
the proposed legislation – particularly from the hotel trade. The principal argument 
against the Bill was not that it would be bad for the industry but that Bevin’s motive 
was purely party political. The opposition to the Bill’s Second Reading was led by Sir 
Douglas Hacking,160 who said: 
 
The difference between (Bevin’s) views, political views if you like, and those of my 
friends and myself is that he would desire to interfere with private enterprise in any 
circumstances, while I would say that you should never interfere with private enterprise 
until you have proved that it is not doing its job.161 
 
Many of the actions of the Ministry of Labour had interfered with private enterprise in 
the interests of the war effort. However, the Catering Wages Bill sought to go one step 
further and introduce a permanent interference and as a result opponents of the Bill 
were in a very strong position to oppose it. Only a few months earlier the Government 
had considered what it would do regarding social legislation, and it had given a 
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promise that it would only legislate on matters of social reform where there was ‘a 
general measure of agreement on which action can satisfactorily be based.’162 Apart 
from debating the content of the Bill, those opposed to it felt that they could show that 
there was not ‘a general measure of agreement’ on it they could claim that the 
Government had broken its pledge. 
 
There had been no indication in the King’s speech at the opening of the Parliamentary 
session that the Government intended to introduce such a Bill, nor had any inquiry 
taken place into the catering trade. However, despite this and the hostility presented 
by Conservative back-benchers there was no stopping Bevin’s agenda. He was 
uncompromising in his justification of statutory wage regulation, saying:  
 
I defy any honourable member to point to one industry that was not improved in 
efficiency as a result of coming under (a Trade Board). There is all this talk about 
ruining and wrecking the industry. Read your debates of 1909. Everything has been 
falsified. When the two parties have come together under a Board they have 
contributed to the efficiency of the industry and have never done a single thing that 
can be shown to be against the public interest…163 
 
Bevin had refused to allow any concessions to be made to the Bill at the Committee 
Stage. His adversaries were of the opinion that they were strong enough to warrant 
some changes. They believed that the Catering Wages Act was a price which had to 
be paid for having Bevin as a wartime Minister of Labour. However, Bevin believed 
that there could be no separation of labour problems into wartime and post-war 
classifications. The guarantee of certain minimum conditions of employment to all 
workers was for him a fundamental right of all citizens. Workers in the catering trade 
could only get the basic protection through the law and Bevin was frank in insisting 
that they got this protection. 
 
The catering trade was not one single industry, but instead a collection of trades that 
shared a common trait that they supplied food, drink or accommodation. Those 
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employed within these categories would be covered by the Act. However, the trade 
was not sufficiently cohesive to be administered by a single regulating body.  
 
The Act created the Catering Wages Commission to watch over the whole trade. The 
Commission was to have tripartite membership consisting of three independent 
members along with four representative members – two for the employers and two for 
the workers. The representatives were not to act as assessors or spokespeople for 
the interests in the catering trade – they had to be ‘qualified to represent the views of 
employers and workers respectively, but are not themselves directly connected with 
the hotel and catering trade.’164 
 
The Commission had two principal functions. It had the authority for deciding how the 
trade should be divided into sections for the purpose of wage regulation. The Minister 
was only authorised to create a Board with the recommendation of the Commission. 
However, he was able to instruct the Commission to make an inquiry on terms of 
reference set by him, and he was able to refer back the recommendations of the 
Commission. The Minister could not set up a Board on his own initiative or modify what 
the Commission had recommended.  He had the power to refer recommendations 
back to the Commission and since there was no limit on the number of times he could 
do so it amounted to a power of veto. However, the clear intention was to hand to the 
Commission the power to determine the structure of statutory wage regulation in the 
trade. 
 
This function of the Commission’s work was of the greatest importance when it was 
initially established and when the boundaries between the Boards were being drawn 
up. Between 1944 and 1945 five Boards had been created.165 
 
The second function of the Commission served to justify it as a permanent body 
making an annual report to Parliament. It was to conduct inquiries ‘into means for 
meeting the requirements of visitors from overseas, and for developing the tourist 
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traffic.’166 Boards were given the powers to make their own inquiries and to submit 
their findings to the Commission. Since 1918 Trade Boards had had the power to carry 
their own inquiries, and the Minister’s power to order a Board to carry out an inquiry 
derived from the TBA 1909. No Board had ever used the power under the TBA 1918, 
and only one inquiry had ever been ordered by the Minister under the Act of 1909.167 
 
It is possible to draw a conclusion from this that although the function of Trade Boards 
was to concern themselves with a wider question than just wages and conditions of 
employment they showed no real interest in doing so. The function of the Commission 
as leader of the whole industry, showing employers how to take advantage of new 
developments derived very little encouragement from the Boards. However, the 
Commission had a statutory existence along with its own staff which enabled it to make 
a number of inquiries. Between 1944 and 1947 the Commission had published a 
number of reports. These were on the rehabilitation of the catering industry, the 
staggering of holidays, training, tips, employment agencies, and allegations of over-
charging for holiday accommodation. However, the Commission had no statutory 
power to make any changes. The Act only provided that government departments 
should take the recommendations of the Commissions ‘into consideration’.168 The 
Commissions wide and varying powers were not accompanied by any authority to put 
its recommendations into practice. 
 
Apart from the existence of the Commission there were two other main differences 
between the Catering Wages Act 1943 and the Wages Councils Act 1945. Probably 
one of the main differences was that employment in catering usually required long 
working hours. The working day was quite different in hotels than that in a factory or a 
shop. The Act required that the Board to fix ‘the intervals for meals or rest to be 
allowed’.169 The other peculiarity of catering which produced special legislation had to 
do with the difficulty that was inherent in identifying catering undertakings. There were 
a number of difficulties linked to discovering all of the employers that came within the 
scope of a Wages Council or Board, but the normal means could not be relied upon 
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to be effective within the catering trade. The Minister had the power to command that 
all employers that were covered by a Board register that they did so. This power had 
only been used in one situation, and it was a disaster. In 1946, on the instruction of 
the Commission, the Minister required that all employers that fell within the scope of 
the Unlicensed Residential Establishment Wages Board should register. Boarding 
houses were the main type of business that fell within this scope and they presented 
the greatest problem. By 1950 there were there was only 20,130 employers who had 
registered compared with what the Commission believed to be between 60,000 to 
80,000 in this section of the trade alone.170 
 
The Wages Councils Act 1945 
 
In 1909, the minority report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of 
Distress,171 largely drafted by Beatrice Webb, saw statutory wage regulation as part 
of an integrated strategy, along with social insurance, for addressing persistent labour 
market inadequacies along with related imbalances.172 A number of steps were taken 
towards confirming a national minimum wage during the early part of the twentieth 
century. The National Industrial Conference of 1919, which was set-up with the 
encouragement of the post-war Liberal Government, put forward detailed proposals 
for a legally binding 48-hour working week along with a universal minimum wage, only 
for these plans to falter in the face of opposition from employers.173 The result that was 
reached with the enactment of the Wages Councils Act 1945 was a compromise. It 
involved the expansion of the Wages Councils alongside government support for 
industry-level, multi-employer bargaining in the voluntary sector. In doing so the 
Government gave its backing to the enforcement of basic wage levels along with terms 
and conditions on an industry-by-industry basis, but it also preserved the autonomy of 
collective bargaining, which was of major significance at a time of ‘collective laissez-
faire’ UK industrial relations.174 
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As the Second World War drew to an end the existing Trade Board system was 
replaced with the Wages Councils Act 1945. There was a reason for the change of 
name. The Act not only widened ‘Trade Board legislation but is a declaration by 
Parliament that the conception of what was known as a sweated industry is past’.175 
Whilst a robust scheme was required wholescale State regulation of wages was not 
an option since it was not a practical proposition: 
 
I cannot believe… that Parliament could ever satisfactorily adjust the actual wages to 
be paid to the people in respective industries, in view of the change in conditions that 
continually takes place in the industries. Therefore, the legislature took a middle 
course. It adopted the principle of legal enforcement, together with the creation of 
autonomous Boards to say what the wages were to be enforced should be.176   
 
The powers that were given to Wages Councils were similar in nature to those that 
were conferred by the Catering Wages Act 1943 in that a Council could make 
suggestions to the Minister rates of remuneration, holiday entitlements along with 
holiday pay. The Councils would be given the authority to set a guaranteed weekly 
minimum wage. The terms of the wages orders would become an implied term in the 
contract of employment. As well as civil action any employer breaching these wage 
regulations could face potential criminal charges. The passage of the Act meant that 
the: 
 
Wages and conditions of work of fifteen million men and women, the overwhelming 
majority of the working population, would come under the protection of negotiated 
agreements or statutory regulations.177 
 
Bevin’s intention was that the Wages Councils Act would be the ‘statutory foundation 
of a comprehensive system of industrial relations’.178 The immediate purpose of the 
legislation made it possible to regulate wages within the retail distribution trade, and 
to incorporate a number of modifications to the system. However, its principal aim was 
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to allow for the provision of legislative framework for collective bargaining which would 
guarantee all workers, in all industries, certain industrial rights. 
 
The fundamental considerations that were taken in drawing up the Act was the need 
to protect voluntary collective bargaining against the effects of economic depression. 
The improvements that were made to collective bargaining during the First World War, 
the recommendations made by the Whitley Committee, the extension of JIC’s and the 
Trade Boards themselves, had been swept away at an unbelievable rate when the 
post-war boom began. After the Second World War, Bevin intended that a system of 
national collective bargaining would survive and economic slump. The Economist 
commented that the new law was ‘one of the most important pieces of legislation ever 
laid before Parliament.’179 
 
The Act was theoretically applicable to every worker in the country, whereas the TBA 
1918 limited coverage to those working in ‘specified trades’,180 the 1945 Act could be 
applied to ‘the workers described in the order and their employers…’181 who could be 
defined in any way in which the Minister desired. The actions for creating Councils 
remained the same as those that were established under the TBA 1918. However, it 
was possible, under the 1945 Act for employers and trade unions to apply jointly to 
the Minister for the creation of a Council ‘on the grounds that the existing machinery 
for the settlement of remuneration and conditions of employment is likely to cease to 
exist or be adequate’.182 Furthermore, the Minister was given the power to set in 
motion the procedure for establishing a Council when in his opinion, the voluntary 
bargaining machinery was likely to break down. This addition to the law was 
anticipated to act as a safety net allowing the State to be able to employ a Council 
where negotiations between the parties was not working. Voluntary negotiating bodies 
would have greater assurance in the face of unemployment knowing that they were 
able to ask the Minister to establish a Wages Council to take over their jobs, if they 
were unable to carry on, trades would not be left without any means of regulating 
wages. The Act also provided that organisations of employers and employees could, 
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if they wished, make a joint application for the Council to be abolished on the grounds 
that their voluntary machinery was adequate. 
 
A provision was also made within the Act that the Minister was required to refer a joint 
request for a new Council to a Commission of Inquiry for its examination. The 
Commission could recommend that the Council be created because ‘the existing 
machinery is likely to cease to exist or be adequate and that as a result a reasonable 
standard of remuneration… will not be maintained’.183 
 
Perhaps, however, the most important element of the Wages Councils Act 1945 was 
the increased power that it gave to the Wages Councils. They were able to regulate 
all aspects of pay184, hours and holidays185 within the trades in which they operated. 
Approximately one in four of all workers (4.5 million) had their pay, hours and holidays 
regulated through a wages council.186  This new legislation, just by the sheer weight 
of the numbers affected transformed Britain’s statutory wage-fixing machinery.  
 
The Act intended to prevent the breakdown of collective bargaining in the following 
way. The rise in unemployment along with the downward pressure on wages, would 
lead some employers to end the agreements that they had with the trade unions in the 
understanding that the unions would be too fragile to force them to keep the 
agreements. The result would be that employers would receive a competitive 
advantage over those employers that stuck to the agreements with the unions. This 
would then have seen more and more employers negate on the agreements with the 
unions, even some of those employers who wished to keep to the arrangement would 
not want to see themselves losing a competitive edge against other businesses. The 
procedure under the Act would allow those unions and employers who remained on 
the joint negotiating body to make an application to the Minister for the creation of a 
Wages Council. This request would have to be assessed by a Commission of Inquiry. 
If the Commission’s findings were that voluntary negotiations were likely to become 
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inadequate and that as a result, remuneration would become unreasonably low, then 
a Council would be recommended. If created, the Council would ensure that 
negotiations continued between both the unions and employers, and through the legal 
administration of its minimum wages and working conditions, would prevent the 
decline of standards through competition to lower wage costs. 
 
Wages Councils amounted to the use of State power to keep collective bargaining 
going when the economic circumstances could have destroyed it. It asserted the need 
for the legal protection of negotiations between organised groups of workers and 
employers. The system of Trade Boards had always underlined the rights of the 
delegates of industry to suggest the wages which should be imposed within the 
specific trade. The power of the Minister was restricted to a veto, and only used in 
exceptional circumstances. However, the setting up of new Boards had been 
dependent solely upon the Minister and, as had been the case in 1921, if he decided 
to stop creating Boards then that was it, final. The Wages Councils Act granted both 
unions and employers powers over the establishment of Councils. These powers were 
similar to those that they had over wages in Trade Boards. The Act also reduced the 
powers of the Minister, making it difficult for him to block the creation of a Council on 
an application made jointly by unions and employers. 
 
Commissions of Inquiry were given a high standard by which to judge the suitability of 
negotiating machinery that was being used. The Commissions had to assess the 
future performance of the mechanisms that were in use and had to be certain that the 
entirety of a trade conformed to the voluntary arrangements before they could judge 
whether the methods were suitable. With regards to wages, the Commissions had to 
be confident that they would be reasonable in the future before they could reject any 
application for a Wages Council. The whole ethos behind the Act was that if unions 
and employers wanted a Wages Council within their trade then they must be allowed 
to have one. As one of the aims of the Act was to substitute Wages Councils with 
collective bargaining bodies for when unemployment threatened, it was reasonable to 
assume that the wishes of those within the industry should be paramount. This 
argument carried even more weight when the evidence from 1921 was taken into 
consideration, when the Minister had stood by whilst the economic situation was 
destroying collective bargaining machinery throughout the country. 
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A further weight on the Act was the need for Councils within the retailing trade. This 
need had been acknowledged since 1939 and the changes that had been made within 
the trade during the war had occurred on the notion that statutory wage regulation 
would, eventually, be provided to the trade. The retailing trade was such a large and 
important one that its needs were reflected within the legislation. The Shop Assistants’ 
Union had taken advantage of the fact that the Conditions of Employment and National 
Arbitration Order 1940 would allow for them to have the very few voluntary 
arrangements that they had in place recognised as forming part of the terms and 
conditions of employment for the whole trade.  
 
When the Act came into effect four JICs in the retailing187 trade took advantage of their 
rights under the law and applied to the Minister for the creation of Wages Councils and 
in November 1945 the Minister appointed a Commission of Inquiry to examine these 
applications. The JICs for Retail Pharmacy and the Retail Meat Trade did not make 
an application for a Wages Council and as such they were excluded from the 
subsequent inquiries. 
 
The Commissioners had a number of questions that needed answering. The first was 
is the existing voluntary negotiating machinery adequate and is it likely to remain 
adequate? Secondly, do the existing voluntary agreements cover all aspects of both 
wages and working conditions, and are they observed throughout the trade? And 
finally, if the negotiating machinery was inadequate was a reasonable standard of 
remuneration being maintained? Only if the first two questions received a no, could 
the final question then be considered by the Commissioners, for a Council would only 
be established if inadequate negotiating machinery was accompanied with 
unreasonable remuneration.188 Therefore it was feasible that a Commission could 
decide against the creation of a Council for the reasons that although the negotiating 
machinery was inadequate, remuneration was reasonable.  
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In retailing the Commissions reached the conclusion that the JICs did not form an 
adequate negotiating machinery and the Commissions did not believe that there were 
any prospects that they would become strong enough to control wages and conditions 
within the trade. 
 
Following the enactment of the Wages Councils Act 1945, the system of Wages 
Councils expanded. At their peak there was approximately 2.5 million workers that 
were covered by a Council.189  However, throughout the 1960s and 70s attitudes 
towards the need for Wages Councils changed. The predicted mass unemployment 
following the disruption of the Second World War did not materialise and the following 
fifteen years of economic growth led many to question the attractiveness of expanding 
statutory wage regulation. Those who were in opposition to the Wages Councils began 
to assert that they were, in fact, redundant. Bayliss was amongst the chief opponents 
of the Wages Councils. He was the only person to have produced a major study on 
the Councils and projected that ‘full employment was to be a permanent feature of 
society but for a small proportion of the work force, the new economic circumstances 
had rendered Wages Councils obsolete.’190 Bayliss also stated that Wages Councils 
actually hindered free collective bargaining, and that steps should be taken to ensure 
that unnecessary councils could be abolished more speedily.’191 This same opinion 
was also expressed by the trade union movement and was echoed in the report of the 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions’ and Employers’ Associations (Also known as the 
Donovan Commission) and by the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI).192  
 
The evidence provided to the Donovan Commission, by the Ministry of Labour, was 
particularly critical of the wages councils. It signalled a crucial change in the 
Department’s post-war support for statutory wage regulation. The Minister stated that 
future policy would be directed towards the removal of wages council’s as soon as 
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collective bargaining was deemed to be adequate.193 With the Ministry of Labour 
affirming that the taking apart of the wages councils would create few complications, 
it was hardly a surprise then that the Commission on Industrial Relations (set-up by 
the Conservative Government in 1971) could, after scrutinising thirty councils, 
recommend that five should be purged.194 
 
The 1979 Wages Councils Act consolidated the provisions of the Wages Councils Act 
1959 along with substantial amendments that were made by the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 and some minor amendments that were introduced by the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (these will not be discussed in this thesis). 
 
During the 1980s the Conservative Government’s began to view the work that the 
Wages Councils did as both unnecessary and undesirable. In 1985 they were 
advocating the abolition of the Councils and a consultative paper was issued which 
set out grounds for either reform or outright abolition. Outright abolition did not 
materialise. However, Part 2 of the Wages Councils Act 1986 made a number of major 
changes to the power of the Councils. These included, excluding workers under the 
age of 21 from the scope of the Councils, restricting them to setting a single minimum 
hourly rate, a single hourly overtime rate along with a maximum accommodation 
charge offset. The Act required Councils to consider the impact on jobs of the rate set 
and it introduced a much more simplified procedure for abolishing or changing the 
scope of Councils. It gave the Secretary of State the power ‘to consult such persons 
or organisations as he considers appropriate’. Further changes to the system were 
again made in 1993.195  The Government’s arguments for abolishing the Councils were 
based on three points. These were: 
 
1. That minimum wages did little to alleviate poverty, as most workers that were 
covered by a Council did not live in poor households. A Department of 
Employment Press Notice stated that: ‘Eighty per cent of people in Wages 
Councils industries live in households with at least one other source of income’. 
																																																						
193
 Royal Commission on Trade Unions’ and Employers’ Associations (Minutes of Evidence), 
(HMSO, London, 1966) pp. 231-232 
194
 Hugh Clegg, The Changing Systems of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, (Wiley-Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1979) p 425	
195
 Wages Councils were totally abolished with the repeal of Part II of the Wages Councils Act 1986 
by S35 of the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 
63	
	
 
2. The minimum wages set by Wages Councils reduced employment in covered 
industries. ‘Where the Wages Councils force companies to pay more than they 
can they destroy jobs.’196 
 
3. The Wages Council system was an anachronism; the issues they were set up 
to solve were yesterday’s problems and were therefore no longer relevant to 
today’s labour market:  
 
Wages Councils were established in the early 1900s when there were no 
employment rights, no general health and safety legislation and little social 
security protection. They have no role to play in the 1990s.197 
 
The Conservatives claimed that any falls in wages due to the abolition were likely to 
be small. There were two parts to its claim. Firstly, it argued that only a small number 
of workers in trades that had a Council received a wage at or close to the minimum. 
Secondly, it argued that those earning above the minimum would not be affected by 
the Council’s abolition. The Government’s argument therefore was that wages would 
not fall as a result of abolition as the majority of those that were protected by a Council 
were already paid above the minimum rates within their trade and that the system was 
irrelevant for them. However, Dickens and others have suggested that this idea was 
wrong. They identified that ‘minimum wage rates do seem to affect workers located 
higher in the wage distribution, although with a declining impact on those earning 
higher wages.’198  
 
Both the Trade Boards Acts 1909 and 1918 along with the Wages Councils Acts of 
1945, 1959 and 1979 failed to establish a universal legal entitlement to a minimum 
wage. In their book, Industrial Democracy, the Webb’s’ had argued for: 
  
A systematic and comprehensive Labour Code, prescribing the minimum conditions 
under which the community can afford to allow industry to be carried on; and including 
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not merely definite precautions of sanitation and safety, and maximum hours of toil, 
but also a minimum of weekly earning.199 
 
David Metcalf identifies that, Fabian writers had, at the time, a fully worked out 
hypothesis of the minimum wage. They had foreseen later debates over levels, 
enforcement along with the relationship between the statutory minimum wage and the 
social security system.200 
 
Both the Labour and Conservative Party agreed that Wages Councils were no longer 
viable for a modern economy. However, both had differing opinions on the issue of the 
future of State intervention with wages. The Conservative’s favoured total abolition of 
the Councils, with no State intervention thereby allowing the market to regulate pay. 
Whereas Labour favoured replacing the Councils with a single national minimum 
wage, applicable across all trades throughout the country.201 
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Chapter 4  
The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and Beyond 
 
“The National Minimum Wage has become a genuine national treasure since it was 
introduced in 1999. The concept enjoys support from business leaders and trade 
unions alike and is a matter of political consensus.”202 
 
The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (NMWA) introduced a statutory right to be paid 
a certain amount of remuneration for work carried out. Almost all workers in the UK 
are entitled to receive the National Minimum Wage (NMW) or the National Living Wage 
(NLW). 
 
This thesis has shown that throughout the majority of the twentieth century there has 
been some form of statutory wage regulation in the UK, albeit not a universal national 
minimum, applicable to all trades and all regions of the UK. In this chapter my thesis 
will examine the implementations of the NMW. It will look at the policy reasons behind 
why the Act was introduced along with the developments of the legislation since its 
enactment which led to the NLW. 
 
A NMW for the whole of the UK had been under examination within the Labour Party 
for decades. However, during much of that time this policy was not only opposed by 
businesses, but was a source of argument or lack of interest, within the labour 
movement as a whole. The commitment to introduce a NMW was a feature in Labour’s 
1992 general election manifesto, but it was proven to be a source of vulnerability rather 
than a winning policy idea and Labour failed to win the election. After this election 
defeat a number of things happened which saw the beginnings of the policy that 
Labour would take into government in 1997. First to change was the academic debate 
which surrounded the idea of a national minimum wage began to change. A number 
of academics started to publish research that began challenging the long held view 
that a national minimum wage would destroy jobs. Pioneering empirical research 
carried out by David Card and Alan Krueger in the United States had identified that 
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there was no adverse effect on employment for those aged 25 and over, and that there 
was only a small effect for those aged under 25.203 Within the UK, academics analysed 
the effects of the abolition of the Wages Councils and arrived at the conclusion that 
they had not reduced employment.204 
 
This change in academic thinking was accompanied by a shift within the Labour Party. 
In the days before the sudden death of John Smith,205 employment spokesperson, 
John Prescott announced the decision not to set a specific level of minimum wage 
until at least the next general election, saying ‘There will come a time when we have 
to set the rate, but let us argue about the principle first.’206 
 
By 1995 the Labour Party had made a pledge to establish a Low Pay Commission 
(LPC). The Commission was to be made up of representatives from employers, 
employees along with independent members, which would set the national minimum 
wage rate. However, simply making these pledges was not enough and arrangements 
were started for a new government to introduce a NMW. Two groups were created to 
develop the proposals between 1994-1996 and were both headed by Ian 
McCartney.207 One group would look at the implementation of the minimum wage, 
whilst the other would look at coverage of it along with enforcement. 
 
Whilst all of this was taking place, the Labour Party started to build the political case 
for the NMW. They initially began with the business case, arguing that low pay 
weakened the ability of businesses to compete and that high turnover brought higher 
costs through training and recruitment. The Party also started to reposition the NMW 
to put it in the wider economic context of welfare reform, using the slogan – Making 
Work Pay. Equally, they started to build the political case through their ‘fat cats’ 
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campaigns, underlining the inequality of the treatment of people at the bottom of the 
pay ladder in contrast to those at the top. Cedric Brown, former British Gas Chief 
Executive, was the poster boy of the campaign.208 
 
All of this preparatory work resulted, by 1997, in the idea of a NMW becoming a 
relatively non-controversial proposition and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
was even prepared to lend its support to the notion. In 1995, the CBI had been arguing 
‘that even a low minimum wage would reduce job opportunities and create major 
problems for wage structures in a wide range of companies’. 
 
The Labour Party’s manifesto for the General Election of 1997 explicitly made the case 
for the introduction of a NMW: 
 
[T]here should be a statutory level beneath which pay should not fall… Every modern 
industrial country has a minimum wage, including the US and Japan… Introduced 
sensibly, the minimum wage will remove the worst excesses of low pay (and be of 
particular benefit to women), while cutting some of the massive £4 billion benefits bill 
by which the taxpayer subsidises companies that pay very low wages.209 
 
In contrast to 1992, the Party’s 1997 election manifesto made a pledge to introduce a 
method to set the minimum wage:  
 
Decided not on the basis of a rigid formula but according to the economic 
circumstances of the time and with the advice of an independent low pay commission, 
who’s representatives will include representatives of employers, including small 
businesses, and employees.210 
 
The NMW was established through the NMWA 1998. The Act came into effect on the 
31st July 1998. The Act provided a broad definition of an eligible worker and made it 
clear that there would be a single national rate and that it would apply to all regions of 
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the UK, all sectors and all sizes of business. S1 (3) of the Act grants the Secretary of 
State the power to amend the rate of the minimum wage. The Act also grants workers 
the right to recover any past underpayments of wages.211 A worker can commence 
proceedings against their employer to recover arrears either in the Employment 
Tribunal (or, in Northern Ireland, the Industrial Tribunal) for a breach of Part II of the 
Employment Rights Act 1998 (or Part IV of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) 
Order 196) as an unlawful deduction from wages claim or as a breach of contract 
claim. Or, in the County Court (or, Sheriff Court in Scotland) as a breach of contract 
claim. 
 
The NMWA 1998 also specified financial penalties for businesses which failed to 
comply with the requirements of the legislation. The Act ensured that all workers, 
except those whom were self-employed were covered and it provided for the creation 
of the LPC on a statutory basis.212 However, the Act did leave some important 
elements to Regulations, such as the definition of pay and hours, along with the rate 
of the NMW. 
 
Crucially, the NMWA 1998 put the LPC on a permanent statutory footing with an 
ongoing remit to make recommendations on the NMW. This move proved to be 
unpopular and was opposed by HM Treasury which had wanted to take over the right 
to set the minimum wage rate in the future. 
 
The Conservatives intensely opposed the introduction of the NMW in angry debates 
on the floor of the House of Commons, much like they did during the debates on the 
TBA 1909. However, the party soon began to make noises that they were planning to 
drop their opposition to the NMW just a month after it came into effect; apparently as 
a part of an attempt to secure the resignation of John Redwood from the shadow 
cabinet, a vocal opponent of the NMW.213 On the 2nd February 2000, the then 
Conservative Party leader, William Hague, reshuffled his shadow cabinet, removing 
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John Redwood and appointing Michael Portillo as Shadow Chancellor. One of 
Portillo’s first acts was to reverse the party’s opposition to the NMW.214 Portillo saying 
that the party should not be concerned with the NMW ‘at the modest level at which it 
has been set by the government… The minimum wage has caused less damage to 
employment than we feared’, instead pledging to improve the way in which it was 
administered.215 
 
The 2001 Conservative Party election manifesto, however, made no reference to the 
NMW. It was not until the general election of 2005, under the leadership of Michael 
Howard, that the party made a manifesto commitment to retain the NMW.216 In that 
same year, David Cameron, the then shadow Secretary of State for Education and 
Skills, commented that the NMW had ‘turned out much better than many people had 
expected, including the CBI’.217 Similarly, in a 2008 lecture, the then shadow 
Chancellor, George Osbourne, said that ‘modern Conservatives acknowledged the 
fairness of a minimum wage’. And the then Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, 
advocated a living wage for London. Essentially, a higher minimum wage to account 
for the higher living costs associated with the capital.218 
 
The NMWA owes much of its design to the system of Wages Councils, and even more 
to the original TBA 1909. The structure of the Low Pay Commission is almost identical 
to those arrangements that were introduced for the Trade Boards at setting wages. As 
with the TBA 1909, the NMWA contains no statutory mechanism for automatically 
uprating the NMW in line with the increase in prices and the cost of living. This can be 
contrasted with our European neighbours, notably the French model of the ‘minimum 
growth wage’ (Salaire minimum interprofessional de croissance (SMIC)). The law 
governing the SMIC, which has been in place since 1970, directly links minimum pay 
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to price inflation, and also makes a provision for it to be raised each year by at least 
half the increase in the value of the purchasing power of the average wage.219 
 
The LPC produces annual reports and there have been a number of adjustments to 
the minimum wage rates over time, along with the introduction of a rate for 16-17 year 
olds in October 2004 and a rate for apprentices which was introduced in October 2010. 
According to the LPC the NMW had a significant impact to those at the bottom of the 
income scale – particularly women who comprised 70% of the beneficiaries and who 
were not covered by existing collective agreements.220 
 
As has been seen throughout this thesis the debate surrounding the desirability and 
need of a NMW has focussed almost entirely on issues of both social and economic 
policy. The claim of the social right that a worker be paid at a rate which was 
satisfactory to support an adequate standard of living for a family was, as already 
discussed, a persistent feature of pay demands in the nineteenth century. The TBA 
1909 sprung, in part, from this general acceptance of the justice of this aim. A more 
persistent social theme that has been touched upon in this thesis has been the 
unacceptability of employers obtaining the benefits of labour at rates of pay which left 
workers in poverty. As social security became more extensive Simpson identifies that 
it was seen to be more: 
 
Socially unacceptable that employers should receive what is in effect a State subsidy 
towards their labour costs where low pay… meant that the standard of living of those 
workers… receiving it was only brought up to a socially acceptable level through the 
provisions of State benefits.221 
 
When the debate on a NMW turned to economic policy, these issues proved to be 
much more quarrelsome. Strong arguments were made over the centuries both for 
and against a NMW regarding its potential effects on employment levels along with 
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the competitiveness of employers, particularly in international markets. Along with the 
arguments based on data from countries which already had some form of minimum 
wage in place,222 and the exclusion of workers under 21 from the remit of Wages 
Councils in 1986 along with their final abolition in 1993, provided both sides with 
opportunities to delve through the data to assess whether any evidence as to how the 
introduction of a NMW would affect the labour market.223 
 
In order for a person to qualify for the NMW that individual must be a worker, they 
must be working and must be over compulsory school age.224 The term worker is given 
a broader sense in the Act and extends beyond just employees.225 S34 of the Act also 
provides that agency workers226 qualify to be paid the NMW along with 
homeworkers.227 
 
A long standing question is what is a satisfactory rate of pay and what amount of 
money does a person need to be able to live on to be able to afford all of the things 
needed in life, such as the ability to pay rent or a mortgage, travel, food and bills etc.? 
This question was answered in the Australian case of Ex parte H.V. McKay - 228 
commonly referred to as the Harvester Case which was a landmark labour law 
decision in Australia. The case came about under the Excise Tariff Act 1906. This Act 
contained a provision that excise would not be payable on products if a manufacturer 
paid a fair and reasonable wage to its employees.229 The question, therefore, for the 
Court to answer was what was a fair and reasonable wage for this purpose? 
 
In this case Justice Higgins of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court 
decided to determine what a ‘fair and reasonable’ wage was using the following test: 
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In the case of unskilled labourers – what are the normal needs of the average 
employee regarded as a human being living in a civilised community?... The conditions 
as to the remuneration must be fair and reasonable whether the profits [of the 
business] are small or great…230 
 
This judgment gave rise to the legal requirement for a basic wage. In defining a fair 
and reasonable wage, Higgins J employed Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum of 1891 
which was an open letter to all the Bishops addressing the conditions of the working 
classes.231 Higgins J ruled that: 
 
A fair and reasonable remuneration… means that the wages shall be sufficient to 
provide… the means of obtaining commodities… and clothing, and a condition of frugal 
comfort estimated by current human standards.232 
 
 
His judgment read as follows: 
 
… what is meant by 'fair and reasonable,' what is the model or criterion by which 
fairness and reasonableness are to be determined. It is to be regretted that the 
Legislature has not given a definition of the words. It is the function of the Legislature, 
not of the Judiciary, to deal with social and economic problems; it is for the Judiciary 
to apply, and, when necessary, interpret the enactments of the Legislature… 
 
The provision for 'fair and reasonable' remuneration is obviously designed for the 
benefit of the employees in the industry; and it must be meant to secure to them 
something which they cannot get by the ordinary system of individual bargaining with 
employers.... 
 
The standard of 'fair and reasonable' must therefore be something else, and I cannot 
think of any other standard appropriate than the normal needs of an average 
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employee, regarded as a human being in a civilised community. If, instead of individual 
bargaining, one can conceive of a collective agreement - an agreement between all 
the employers in a given trade on the one side, and all the employees on the other - it 
seems to me that the framers of the agreement would have to take as the first and 
dominant factor the cost of living as a civilised being…233 
 
The ruling was regarded as a benchmark in Australian labour law. Higgins J regarded 
the minimum wage as sacrosanct and applied the reasoning to a number of 
subsequent judgments.  
 
So what is a fair and reasonable wage and is the NMW in the United Kingdom fair and 
reasonable? Can those who are only paid the basic wage afford to live in comfort? 
Does it take them out of poverty? Are they able to provide for themselves and their 
families? 
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The Living Wage Campaign & The National Living Wage. 
 
‘A living wage must not be a killing wage. If it cripples or destroys the industry from 
which it is drawn it is guilty of felo de se. You must not kill the goose that lays the 
golden egg.’234 
 
One question that has dominated the discussions surrounding wages in recent years 
in the United Kingdom since the introduction of the NMW is does it provide a 
reasonable remuneration? Do wages take people out of poverty? What does a person 
need to earn to live in frugal comfort? 
 
The principle argument underlying the calls for a living wage is a simple yet powerful 
one: that work should bring dignity and should pay enough to provide families the 
essentials of life. As has been discussed throughout this thesis this very notion has 
deep historical roots, which first began to emerge in Britain during the 1870s. Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb argued that the early trade unions began to challenge the doctrine 
of supply and demand with the doctrine of a living wage.235 Workers began to make 
demands that wages should be at a rate to afford them to buy such things as food, 
clothing and shelter for themselves and their families. 
 
Betsy Clary argues that a wage is much more than mere compensation for labour. It 
is a means of securing a living and leads to public policies that address both the level 
of the wage as well as the fairness, adequacy, and its decency.236 Adam Smith, in his 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,237 recognised that rising 
real wages lead to:  
 
The improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of people and should be 
regarded as an advantage to society… Servants, labourers and workmen of different 
kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society. But what improves 
the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as inconveniency to the 
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whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of 
the members are poor and miserable. It is but equality, besides, that they who feed, 
clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the 
produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed and 
lodged.238 
 
According to some living wage advocates Smith advocated that labour should receive 
an equitable share of what labour produces. For Smith, this equitable share amounted 
to more than just subsistence. Smith equated the interests of labour and the interests 
of the land with overarching social interests. He reasoned that as wages and rents 
rise, as a result of higher productivity, societal growth will occur thereby increasing the 
quality of life for the greater part of its members.239 
 
The first full-length treatise advancing the calls for a living wage was written in 1894 
by the Liberal Member of Parliament for Dewsbury, Mark Oldroyd. In a speech to the 
Dewsbury Pioneers Industrial Society240 given in December 1894, Oldroyd declared 
that: ‘A living wage must be sufficient to maintain the worker in the highest state of 
industrial efficiency, with decent surroundings and sufficient leisure’.241 He defined a 
living wage as: 
 
[A] wage by which the worker may obtain the means of subsistence for himself and for 
those whom are legitimately dependent upon him. A wage by which the worker may 
provide reasonable home comforts and fit himself for the discharge of the duties of 
citizenship and; that the wage should be earned under such conditions as regards 
sanitary regulations, physical and mental effort, and duration of working hours, as will 
not interfere with his powers of recuperation, and as will afford reasonable time for 
recreation and rest.242 
 
During the debates and passing of the TBA 1909, social reformers sought to bring 
rigour and clarity to the concept of a living wage. The leading figure was Benjamin 
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Seebohm Rowntree, who developed a methodology for calculating the living wage, or 
what he called the human costs of labour. Rowntree carried out research in York to 
price the food, rent, clothing, fuel and miscellaneous items needed by a man with three 
children. He argued that poverty was the result of low wages, going against the 
traditionally held view that the poor were responsible for their own plight. 
 
Rowntree was a key supporter in the extension of Trade Boards and believed that they 
should cover every industry; and that that should fix wages around the new standard 
of 35.s and 3.d per week – based on the 1914 prices for all adult men. He argued that 
the nation depended on a living wage to ensure its workers were fit and healthy 
enough to work and take part in the wider community. 
 
The NMW has been set at a level determined by the market rather than Rowntree’s 
formula of the human needs of labour. Section 7 of the NMWA 1998 requires that the 
LPC consult employers’ and workers’ representative bodies in making their 
recommendations, and in doing so ‘shall have regard to the effect of this Act on the 
economy of the United Kingdom as a whole and on competitiveness.’243 Therefore the 
NMW reflects what the market can bear rather than what an individual actually needs 
to earn in order to live. 
 
The Independent Labour Party (ILP) took up the mantel for the demand for a living 
wage and adopted it as official party policy from 1925. A Living Wage Bill was 
proposed, by James Maxton,244 in the House of Commons in February 1931. Maxton 
positioned the policy within the context of the curse of under-consumption. At a time 
of economic crisis, high unemployment and in the wake of the general strike, Maxton 
sought to focus on the politics of consumption as well as production. A living wage, it 
was argued, would allow the population to consume ‘the essential things of life… food, 
better housing… better furnishings, equipment inside their home, better illumination of 
those homes, and better sanitation.’245 This, in turn, would stimulate growth, jobs and 
prosperity for the nation as a whole. Putting money into the pockets of the poor, it was 
argued, was a way out of decline. However, in the event, although 124 Labour Party 
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MPs voted in support of the Bill, it failed to win enough votes in the Commons to allow 
it to proceed.  
 
With hindsight, it is clear that during the post-war years the welfare state slowly but 
surely began to eclipse the demand for a living wage. As has already been discussed 
in this thesis - the provision of education, health, housing and pensions, together with 
the growth of collective bargaining and the operation of Wages Councils, relegated to 
the side-lines the demand for a living wage.  
 
The notion of a living wage was not to resurface as a political demand in the country 
until in 2001 when a campaign began in London’s East End led by the charity London 
Citizens. The campaign that began in the UK arose, partly through the experiences of 
their sister organisation in the USA, notably in Baltimore, where the living wage 
movement had taken off during the mid-1990s, but it also arose from the very structure 
of London’s economy.  In 2000 London Citizens held a listening campaign to identify 
what the pressures on families and communities existed in the East End.  After 
speaking to thousands of people it was identified that the common burden on families 
was that parents had less time to spend with their children and with their local 
communities. Why? Was the question that was asked – the answer – because both 
parents were working sometimes two or three jobs to make ends meet. Why was this? 
Because the minimum wage is not enough to live on. 
 
In 2005, following a series of successful Living Wage campaigns, and with a growing 
interest from a number of employers, the Greater London Authority established the 
Living Wage Unit to calculate the London Living Wage. By 2008, Trust for London 
selected the London Living Wage as a special initiative and made a grant of over £1 
million to deliver direct campaign work, research and an accreditation scheme for 
employers.246  
 
Local campaigns began to emerge across the whole of the UK offering the opportunity 
to involve many more employers and lift many more thousands of families out of 
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working poverty. The current UK Living Wage rate is set at £8.45 per hour and the 
Living Wage rate for London is set at £9.75 per hour.247 The Living Wage is reviewed 
each year by independent academics, with rate increases announced in November 
during Living Wage Week. The Living Wage Foundation awards the Living Wage 
Employer Mark to employers that commit to pay the Living Wage or higher. There are 
3,249 employers across the United Kingdom that pay the Living Wage or greater.248 
 
The Centre for Research in Social Policy249 (CRSP) funded by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation250 began calculating a UK wide Minimum Income Standard251 (MIS) figure. 
The MIS is an average across the whole of the UK, but does not reflect the variation 
of the cost of living inside and outside of London. 
 
The CRSP’s research, from 2017, suggested that the following groups need a weekly 
MIS to meet basic needs:252 
 
Single 
Person
253 
Couple
254 
Single 
Parent
255 
Single 
Parent
256 
Single 
Parent
257 
Couple
258 
Couple
259 
Couple
260 
£296.82 £443.63 £603.91 £711.54 £824.59 £692.93 £800.17 £923.27 
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253
 No children 
254
 No children 
255
 With one child (aged 0-1-year-old) 
256
 With two children (one aged 2-4, one primary school age) 
257
 With three children (one aged 2-4, one primary school age, one secondary school age) 
258
 With one child (aged 0-1) 
259
 With two children (one aged 2-4, one primary school age) 
260
 With three children (one aged 2-4, one primary school age, one secondary school age) 
79	
	
These amounts are the minimum amounts that individuals or couples need to have 
available to afford the basics such as rent, mortgage and food and have some left over 
for leisure. So how does this look when compared against the NMW? 
 
As already discussed the NMW does not take into consideration a person 
circumstances with regards to relationship status or whether or not they have 
dependent children. The NMW rates as of April 2017 are as follows:261 
 
Aged 21-24 Aged 18-20 Under 18 Apprentice Rate 
£7.05 per hour £5.60 per hour £4.05 per hour £3.50 per hour 
 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) puts the average weekly hours for 2017 at 
37.5 hours per week.262 Based on this the amount that an individual would earn, after 
income tax and national insurance payments equate to: 
Aged 21-24 Aged 18-20 Under 18 Apprentice Rate 
£7.05 per hour £5.60 per hour £4.05 per hour £3.50 per hour 
£242.88 per 
week263 
£203.64 per 
week264 
£151.88 per 
week265 
£131.25 per 
week266 
 
From these figures it is evident that the NMW is not a sufficient amount to live on, 
according to the CRSP, and falls considerably below the MIS for certain groups, 
especially when dependent children are taken into consideration.  
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Since 1999, when the NMW was introduced, successive governments have avoided 
setting the actual rate at which the it is to be paid – leaving it to the LPC to make 
recommendations based on the need to avoid damaging the economy or prospects 
for employment. The Chancellor,267 in his summer budget of 2015, announced the 
beginning of a National Living Wage (NLW), placing the issue of wages squarely into 
the political sphere. The Chancellor saying ‘Britain deserves a pay rise and Britain is 
getting a pay rise.’268 
 
The LPC has a slightly different remit in relation to the NLW than it does for the other 
bands of the minimum wage. For the NLW the LPC were asked to make 
recommendations on the pace of increase towards a target, the ambition being that it 
should increase from its introductory rate of £7.20 per hour and reach £9 per hour by 
2020, subject to sustained economic growth.269 However, a leading labour think-tank 
has warned that the government is likely to miss its target of £9.00 per hour as a direct 
result of Brexit and, according to the Resolution Foundation, low-paid workers are set 
to lose around 40p per hour because of the projected slowdown in economic growth.270 
Evidence of this slowdown in the planned rise of the NLW were seen in April 2017. 
The government had initially planned to raise the rate to £7.60 per hour but, it only 
increased to £7.50 per hour.271 
 
The NLW should not be confused with the Living Wage. The Living Wage is a 
voluntarily hourly rate that is set independently from the NLW. It is calculated 
according to the cost of living in the United Kingdom. The calculation takes into 
account such things as accommodation, travel, healthy food along with a little extra 
for such things as birthday presents.272  
																																																						
267
 George Osbourne, Chancellor of the Exchequer May 2010 – July 2016 
268
 Financial Statement, HC Debs, 8
th
 July 2015, col 337 
269
 National Minimum Wage, Low Pay Commission Report Autumn 2016, November 2016, cm 9272 
270
 Robert Booth, ‘Government likely to miss £9 minimum wage target, think-tank warns’, The 
Guardian (12 October 2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/oct/12/government-likely-to-miss-9-minimum-wage-target-thinktank-warns accessed 20th 
August 2017 
271
 Rate increased through the National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Regulations 2017, Regulation 
2 
272
 Living Wage Foundation, ‘Everything you need to know about the Living Wage’, Available at: 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/newcitizens/pages/250/attachments/original/1447867827/Ever
ything_you_need_to_know_about_the_Living_Wage_2016.pdf?1447867827 accessed 9
th
 June 2017 
81	
	
So what then is the NLW? There was much confusion when the Chancellor made his 
announcement regarding the NLW’s introduction. No initial details were provided on 
what changes would need to be made to existing legislation. Would a new Act be 
introduced through Parliament or would a Statutory Instrument be sufficient? It 
transpired that no new primary legislation would be used and that, the NLW, was just 
to be another tier of the NMW. 
 
As already mentioned, the NMW is a single hourly rate that is applicable to all workers, 
regardless of the location in which they work or the sector that they work within. 
However, there has always been a power contained within the NMWA 1998, to pass 
regulations to provide for different rates of pay for those under 26 years of age.273 
 
The National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015,274 which consolidated a wide range 
of earlier Regulations, set out four minimum wage rates.275 These were set as age 
bands: over 21 years old; 18 but under 21 years old; under 18; and a rate for 
apprentices. The NLW applies to all workers who are aged 25 and over, so it seems 
that the 2015 Regulations were tailor-made to specify a new rate of the NMW for that 
specific age group. Indeed, that is what happened. No new exciting legislation was 
laid before Parliament. There was no National Minimum Wage Bill like that that was 
introduced in the 1930s. Instead, the Government simply used the 2015 Regulations 
to add a new tier to the age bands and gave the band a name ‘the National Living 
Wage’ when, in-fact, the NLW, for all of its hype, is simply a rewording of the highest 
tier of the NMW. 
 
The so named NLW was added to law through the National Minimum Wage 
(Amendment) Regulations 2016.276 Regulation 3 of the 2016 Regulations made an 
amendment to regulation 4 and added a regulation 4A of the 2015 Regulations. The 
newly added regulation 4 states: ‘The single hourly rate of the national minimum wage 
for the purposes of section 1 (3) of the Act (“the national living wage rate’) is £…’ New 
regulation 4A became the provision for all other hourly rates. 
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The introduction of the NLW on the 1st April 2016, was a significant intervention in the 
labour market. The introductory rate for workers aged 25 and over was a 7.5 per cent 
overnight pay increase. There was a concern as to how businesses would adjust to 
the higher costs of labour. The main sectors that worried about the short-term effect 
comprised of social care providers, who warned of a ‘serious risk of catastrophic 
failure’277 if the new NLW was not fully funded. Convenience stores, small firms in 
general, some food manufacturers, and horticulture and other labour intensive trades, 
such as textiles all voiced concerns.278 
 
As with the NMW it is a criminal offence for an employer not to pay a work the NLW 
or above if they fall into that age category. Regulation 2 of the 2016 Regulations 
increased the financial penalty from 100 per cent to 200 per cent of arrears. The 
maximum penalty is £20,000 per worker, although this is reduced by half if the unpaid 
arrears and financial penalty are paid within 14 days. Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs also operates a name and shame policy for employers who break the law by 
not paying the NMW or NLW. According to a BBC report the government named 360 
businesses that failed to pay either the NMW or NLW in 2016. These received fines 
totalling £800,00. Amongst these were well known firms such as Debenhams, Subway 
and Lloyds Pharmacy. In total more than 15,500 workers had to be paid back nearly 
one million pounds’ worth of arrears.279 However, the ONS has calculated that in April 
2016 there were 362,000 jobs that did not pay the minimum wage.280  
 
The BBC reported that excuses that were made by some employers for not paying the 
full basic wage included using tips to top up pay, making reductions to pay for the 
Christmas party, or making staff pay for their own uniform.281 
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Does the NLW provide a MIS when compared to the data from the CRSP?   
 
Worker aged 25+ 
£7.50 per hour 
Net weekly income of £254.36282 
 
From this it is clear that the NLW falls far below the amount that the CRSP state is 
enough to live on to pay for rent, bills, food etc. Going from the MIS figures, a single 
person would need a gross weekly income of £343.70, equating to £9.17 per hour for 
a 37.5-hour average working week, to receive the MIS advocated by the CRSP of 
£296.82. Much higher than the hourly rate of £8.45 for those outside of London, 
although the London rate of £9.75 as advocated by the Living Wage Foundation, would 
put a single person just ahead of the MIS.283 
 
When the NLW was introduced, there were a number of people who suggested that 
the age at which the level of pay is mandatory is age discrimination. There was also 
concern raised that employers would focus their attention on the recruitment of those 
under 25 years of age in a bid to save on wage costs. The Federation for Small 
Businesses advised employers that focusing recruitment on the under-25s runs the 
risk of breaching age discrimination legislation.284 Indeed S39 (1)(a) of the Equality 
Act 2010 states that an employer must not discriminate against a person in 
arrangements made for deciding whom to offer employment to. However, in practice 
it would prove to be extremely difficult to establishing whether an employer had 
discriminated on grounds of age by offering employment to somebody under 25 rather 
than over. 
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In June 2016 a debate was held in Westminster Hall. The topic – age discrimination 
and the National Living Wage. During the debate Holly Lynch285 highlighted the 
grievances felt by the under-25s saying: 
 
Young workers under the age of 25 rightly feel a sense of injustice at having been left 
out of the pay rise… many workers, under 25, will have discovered that their pay 
package is substantially less than their older colleagues. About 6 million young people 
aged 18 to 24… could be affected… this debate provides an opportunity to examine 
the inequality underpinning that decision and to ask the Government to plan for an 
extension of the national living wage to under-25s.286  
 
For the first time since the minimum wage was introduced in 1999 under 25s are now 
viewed as a distinct, and less deserving, group. This is a situation which is almost 
unique to the UK with only Greece having a similar age threshold in the entire 
developed world.287 France pays the full rate from 18 onwards, as does Germany, and 
even in the USA there is no age threshold apart from the option to pay workers under 
the age of 20 a lower rate for their first few months of employment.288 
 
There is little public support for the NLW only applying to those workers aged 25 and 
over. A poll found that 66 per cent of respondents believed that the same minimum 
wage rate should apply to those that are under-25. Even amongst Conservative 
supporters 55 per cent supported an equal wage for under-25s compared to 35 per 
cent who did not.289 
 
In April 2016, when the NLW was introduced, The Guardian ran a story about Anthony. 
A 23-year-old who worked in a warehouse in London. Overnight, older colleagues 
became entitled to a higher wage for doing the same job that he did. Anthony claiming 
that ‘it’s discrimination against young, hard workers’. He went on to say ‘I was already 
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getting £7.20 per hour… I’m now on £6.70 per hour. It’s been cut just because I’m 23 
and not 25… I’m getting less for doing the same job… I feel so worthless.’290 
 
It is clear that the NLW has given those aged over 25 a premium to their wages, those 
under 25 feel aggrieved that their older colleagues, many of them carrying out the 
same task, should be paid such a premium while they are not. Why, therefore, did the 
Government choose to set the NLW at 25 and not 18? A key argument that the 
Government used was that a lower minimum rate of pay for younger workers reduces 
youth unemployment by ‘incentivising employers to take on young people.’291 
However, as already mentioned employers must comply with the Equality Act 2010 
when recruiting. 
 
Youth unemployment has been a major concern for the UK and Europe since the 
financial crash in 2007.  The tables below show the numbers of people aged between 
16-24 that were not in education, employment or training during those quarters since 
2015. 
 
Jan-Mar 2015 Apr-Jun 2015 Jul-Sep 2015 Oct-Dec 2015 
943,000292 922,000293 848,000294 853,000295 
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Jan-Mar 2016 Apr-Jun 2016 Jul-Sep 2016 Oct-Dec 2016 
865,000296 843,000297 857,000298 826,000299 
 
Jan-Mar 2017 Apr-Jun 2017 
800,000300 790,00301 
 
From analysis of these figures it is clear that youth unemployment has fallen since the 
introduction of the NLW. It is not possible to say whether this is because younger 
workers are paid a lower rate of pay than those aged 25 and above. However, it would 
be reasonable to assume that this has, to a certain extent, contributed to the decline 
in youth unemployment.  
 
There has been a general fall in unemployment over recent years. In a recent BBC 
report it was stated that unemployment now stands at 4.3 per cent and represents the 
lowest rate since 1975. It also reported that there continues to be a squeeze on 
incomes, with wages – in real terms, falling by 0.4 per cent due to inflation.302 If the 
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NLW did apply to all adult workers, i.e. those aged 18 and over, inflation would still be 
a problem, However, all workers would have more income to offset this and help 
alleviate the problem of stagnant wages. 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter)303 is an 
instrument of the European Union (EU). It forms part of EU law and subject to the 
interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union. EU law is given effect in 
national law through the European Communities Act 1972. The Charter was given 
legal effect by the Lisbon Treaty when it entered into force in December 2009. Article 
6 (1) Treaty on European Union provided for the Charter to have the same legal status 
as other EU Treaties. Although the Charter applies to the institutions of the EU at all 
times – it only applies to member states when it is acting within the scope of EU law. 
Article 21 of the Charter states: ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as… 
age… shall be prohibited’. This, along with the Equality Act 2010, may eventually 
persuade the Government that selecting an age rate of 25 for the NLW is a form of 
age discrimination and amend it to 18 – after all, a person aged 18 is by no means 
less capable of doing a job than somebody aged 25. There is a very present risk that 
employers will change their recruitment policies to take on more under 25s in an 
attempt to lower the cost of labour. The downside for the person that is potentially 
discriminated against would be in proving a case of age discrimination – no employer 
would ever admit to recruiting under 25s in a bid to save money. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined, discussed and analysed the systems of minimum wage 
regulation from the 19th to 21st centuries, that have lead the UK to its present form – 
the NWM and the NLW. In concluding this thesis will draw together, what I believe, 
have been the main developments in legislation that lead the UK Government to enact 
a national minimum and wage and a national living wage. This conclusion will also 
comment on what the future may hold for minimum wage regulations in the UK. 
 
The journey that the UK has been on in establishing a universal minimum wage has 
been an exciting one. As this thesis has shown, initially the State had always been 
reluctant to interfere in the negotiation of contracts between employer and employee. 
Preferring to leave it to the market to set the rate. As this thesis has explained, the 
Government was forced to re-think this approach due to the increased campaigns 
highlighting the issue of sweating and the atrocious working conditions associated with 
it. This resulted in the enactment of the TBA 1909. This Act firmly established that the 
Government was willing to intervene in the market when public pressure forced it to 
do so. 
 
Since the passing of the TBA 1909 there have been many changes to wage regulation 
that have varied according to whichever party is in Government. One of the most 
important pieces of legislation was the Munitions Acts of 1916 and 1917. This thesis 
has examined how the Munitions Act were drastically different in nature to the TBA 
1909 as they authorised the Minister to set actual rates of pay – something that the 
1909 Act had been careful not to do. 
 
After the First World War, the Government appeared to be moving towards exercising 
much wider control over wages. This thesis has examined the effects of various Select 
Committees and the recommendations that were made, some believing that the 
function of Trade Boards should be extended, whilst others believed that the 
Government had already gone too far and that the system of Trade Boards should be 
scaled back. 
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This thesis has examined the social legislation that was introduced by the Labour 
Government after the Second World War and its extension of what become known as 
Wages Councils. The Councils extended the system of wage regulation. The Wages 
Councils Act 1945 would ensure that future Governments would not be allowed to 
ignore the issue of wages.  
 
The programme of wage regulation did not change much until the 1980s. This thesis 
has examined the changes that were made to wage regulation by the Conservative 
Government and the ultimate abolishing of the Councils. The impact that this had on 
wages for the lowest paid people in society cannot be underestimated. The progress 
that had been made since the passing of the TBA 1909 was beginning to be unravelled 
at the expense of the lowest paid. 
 
Finally, in 1998 the UK caught up with much of the industrial world. The newly elected 
Labour Government introduced a national minimum wage. This would be applicable 
to all workers over a certain age, in all regions and within all types of business – 
regardless of size. This thesis has examined the impact that the NMW had on 
businesses along with wages in general terms. 
 
There was a growing campaign that began in the 1990s, advocating the notion of a 
living wage. The key argument was and remains, that wages should be sufficient 
enough, in order for people to afford to live. The Living Wage Foundation is an 
independent body, who has set a precedent of what is required for the average person 
to live on, both inside and outside of London. The NLW was introduced by the 
Government in April 2016. This thesis has shown it is an extension of the NMW, with 
a new banding for persons aged 25 and above. There is some debate surrounding the 
differences within the age brackets and whether the NLW is a true comparative to The 
Living Wage.  
 
The impending years will likely see a plethora of changes in the field of employment 
law, as the UK begins the process of exiting the EU. It is difficult to establish at this 
moment, if this will impact on wages and if so to what extent – will the Governments 
plan of having a NLW of £9.00 per hour, by 2020, come to fruition or will they 
reconsider their plans? This thesis has already shown that increases in the NLW rate 
90	
	
has slowed down, in part, due to the impact that leaving the EU has already had on 
UK economic growth. 
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